The influence of strategic and organizational cultures on the Revolution in Military Affairs within the U.S. Army by Kamara, Hassan M.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2015-03
The influence of strategic and
organizational cultures on the
Revolution in Military Affairs within the
U.S. Army
Kamara, Hassan M.














Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
THE INFLUENCE OF STRATEGIC AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURES ON THE REVOLUTION 








Thesis Co-Advisors:  James Russell 
 David S. Yost 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202–4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704–0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
March 2015 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE   
THE INFLUENCE OF STRATEGIC AND ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURES ON 
THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS WITHIN THE U.S. ARMY 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Hassan M. Kamara 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943–5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
This thesis explores the influence of culture on the requirements for a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). It 
assesses how cultural factors at the strategic and the U.S. Army organizational levels may affect the changes required 
for realizing an RMA. Defined as a paradigmatic shift in the conduct of military affairs spurred by the confluence of 
organizational change with new and existing technologies and concepts of operations, the RMA has long been a 
controversial analytical construct. This thesis accepts the premise that the history of warfare can be interpreted as a 
series of RMAs. It explores the complex and powerful influence of American strategic culture and the organizational 
culture of the U.S. Army on the organizational, doctrinal, technology, funding and other factors vital to the realization 
of an RMA. The thesis compares the influence of U.S. strategic and Army organizational culture on the RMA during 
the interwar period (1919–1941) and the contemporary period (since the 2011 withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from 
Iraq) to highlight similarities and differences that U.S. military and civilian leaders can learn from to change the 






14. SUBJECT TERMS  
Revolution in military affairs (RMA), strategic culture, organizational culture, interwar era, strategic 
net assessments, national cognitive style 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
89 

















NSN 7540–01–280–5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF STRATEGIC AND ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURES ON 
THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS WITHIN THE U.S. ARMY 
 
 
Hassan M. Kamara 
Captain, United States Army 
B.A., Arizona State University, 2002 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 



















David S. Yost  





Chair, Department of National Security Affairs 
 
 iv




This thesis explores the influence of culture on the requirements for a Revolution in 
Military Affairs (RMA). It assesses how cultural factors at the strategic and the U.S. 
Army organizational levels may affect the changes required for realizing an RMA. 
Defined as a paradigmatic shift in the conduct of military affairs spurred by the 
confluence of organizational change with new and existing technologies and concepts of 
operations, the RMA has long been a controversial analytical construct. This thesis 
accepts the premise that the history of warfare can be interpreted as a series of RMAs. It 
explores the complex and powerful influence of American strategic culture and the 
organizational culture of the U.S. Army on the organizational, doctrinal, technology, 
funding and other factors vital to the realization of an RMA. The thesis compares the 
influence of U.S. strategic and Army organizational culture on the RMA during the 
interwar period (1919–1941) and the contemporary period (since the 2011 withdrawal of 
U.S. combat forces from Iraq) to highlight similarities and differences that U.S. military 
and civilian leaders can learn from to change the paradigm of military affairs in 
America’s favor. 
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According to Dima Adamsky, a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) refers to a 
“radical military innovation, in which new organizational structures together with novel 
force deployment methods, usually but not always driven by new technologies, change 
the conduct of warfare.”1 Adamsky explains that the realization of an RMA requires an 
innovation in which technology (new or existing) converges with change in a military’s 
organizational structure, concept of war, and vision of future conflict.2  This type of 
change is major. Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff define it as “change in the goals, actual 
strategies, and/or structure of a military organization.”3 Moreover, such a change is 
heavily dependent on strategic and organizational culture. In the 1990s, Theo Farrell and 
Terry Terriff identified culture as a factor of change in the military and defined “cultural 
norms” as “intersubjective beliefs about the social and natural world that define actors, 
their situations, and the possibilities of action.”4    
Using Adamsky’s model for realizing an RMA, this thesis investigates how 
strategic and organizational cultures influence the change required for a revolution in 
military affairs using two cases:  the U.S. Army in the interwar years (1918–1941), and 
the U.S. Army in the contemporary period since the 2011 end of the U.S. military combat 
role in Iraq to the present, a period marked by the Afghanistan drawdown. The goal of 
this investigation is to identify and analyze parallel cultural and organizational factors in 
the interwar and contemporary periods so that policy makers and defense strategists can 
more effectively manage change in the military, and foster an RMA. 
                                                 
1 Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the 
Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the U.S. and Israel (Redwood, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2010), 1. 
2 Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation, 1. 
3 Theo Farrell, “Innovation in Military Organizations Without Enemies,” International Studies 
Association Annual Convention, April 16–20, 1996, in The Sources of Military Change:Culture Politics 
and Technology, ed. Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 5. 
4Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, “The Sources of Military Change,” in  The Sources of Military 
Change:  Culture Politics and Technology, ed. Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2002), 7.   
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These two cases are chosen for comparative analysis because of their similarity. 
Emerging military technologies—including improvements in drones, robotics, and lasers 
spurred by the Iraq and Afghanistan wars—and innovation in force employment methods 
[such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) platoons] make the contemporary period 
analogous to the interwar period, which saw a comparable spate of emerging military 
technologies in the tank, the airplane, and the radio, and the development of combined 
arms formations.   
A. RESEARCH INQUIRY 
As noted above, the goal of this thesis is to identify and analyze the cultural and 
organizational obstacles to constructive change to help policy makers and defense 
strategists manage the process. To this end, the thesis answers the following research 
questions in its investigation: 
(a). How did culture at the strategic and U.S. Army organizational level influence 
the changes required for a Revolution in Military Affairs in the interwar period? 
(b). How does culture at the strategic and U.S. Army organizational level  
influence the changes required for a Revolution in Military Affairs in the contemporary 
period—since the 2011 withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Iraq to the present? 
(c). What are the cultural parallels and developments at the strategic and U.S. 
Army organizational levels between the interwar and contemporary periods, and how can 
knowledge of these factors assist policy makers and defense strategists in their efforts to 
foster change supportive of an RMA? 
B. RESEARCH CHALLENGES 
Why is it important to conduct a comparative study of the U.S. strategic culture 
and the U.S. Army’s organizational culture during the interwar years and the present 
post-Iraq war period?  This study is significant because it seeks to sensitize policy makers 
and defense strategists to established cultural factors that can hamstring the process of 
managing organizational innovation, or the realization of an RMA. The technology 
innovation component required in this model for an RMA is obviously present. This 
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thesis highlights the cultural and organizational factors that can retard and hamper the 
military change component, so today’s policy makers and defense strategists can manage 
them to the benefit of realizing an RMA.   
The English historian C.V. Wedgwood observed that “history is lived forward, 
but it is written in retrospect. We know the end before we consider the beginning and we 
can never wholly recapture what it was like to know the beginning only.”5  The 
impossibility of knowing the future (as the beginning of history) with certainty does not 
dampen the thirst for knowledge about it. Analysts use tools such as comparative 
historical inquiry to help capture some sense of the beginning of history through the 
extrapolation of trends in the past. The roughly parallel chronological position of the 
present period to the interwar years—both occurring in the second decades of two 
centuries, both influenced by preceding wars, and both marked by reduced defense 
budgets—stimulates interest. When apparent parallels between the present and specific 
periods in the past are discerned, it encourages the inquiring mind to search for lessons 
that might help shape the beginning of coming history—the future.   
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Strategic Culture 
In 1995 Alastair Iain Johnston wrote that the literature on strategic culture had 
evolved over three generations.6 In 2010 Dima Adamsky concurred, writing that 
“chronologically the works about cultural impact on national security policy, which were 
introduced under the umbrella of ‘strategic culture,’ came in three waves.”7 This 
literature review examines works on strategic culture consistent with the trifold 
distinction. Reviewing the literature on strategic culture in terms of this grouping 
facilitates contextual understanding of its evolution. 
                                                 
5 C.V. Wedgwood, William the Silent (London:  Cape, 1967), 35. 
6 Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” International Security 19, no. 4 (1995): 
36–41, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539119. 
7 Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation, 6. 
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a. The First Generation of Literature on Strategic Culture 
Alastair Johnston writes that the first generation—which he describes as being in 
the early 1980s—“focused mainly on explaining why the Soviets and the 
Americans…thought differently about nuclear strategy.”8  Works by Jack Snyder (The 
Soviet Strategic Culture), Carl Jacobsen (Strategic Power: USA/USSR), and David Jones 
(Soviet Strategic Culture) characterized this first generation of strategic culture 
literature.9  This generation attributed a country’s strategic thinking and approach to 
national security and foreign relations to its history, and to currently held visceral beliefs 
and assumptions about its place in the international system.10  This generation held that 
elements of a country’s culture—its national history and its socioeconomic and political 
makeup—shaped its strategic choices. Colin Gray wrote before and during the periods 
Johnston defines as the first and second generations of literature on strategic culture. 
Gray wrote that prevalent national assumptions and beliefs shaped America’s Cold War 
view that nuclear wars were to be avoided due to their certain pyrrhic outcome.11  Gray’s 
perspective is echoed in other scholarly works of the period such as David Yost’s 1981 
assessment of France’s strategic style as one influenced by an enduring “preoccupation 
with considerations of Great Power status,” which relies on traditional rationales such as 
its “mission civilisatrice,” to support its capacity for military intervention and  influence 
in Africa.12 
Jack Snyder argued similarly that Soviet and American strategists were influenced 
by national assumptions, beliefs and history. Snyder coined the term “strategic culture,” 
                                                 
8 Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” 36. 
9 Jack L. Snyder, “The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options,” RAND, accessed 
28 April 2014, http://130.154.3.14/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2005/R2154.pdf; 
Carl G. Jacobsen, Strategic Power: USA/USSR (New York:  St. Martin’s Press, 1990); 
David R. Jones, “Soviet Strategic Culture,” in Strategic Power: USA/USSR, ed. Carl G. Jacobsen 
(London: St. Martin’s Press, 1990). 
10 Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation, 6. 
11 Colin Gray, “Nuclear Strategy and National Style” in “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” Alastair 
Iain Johnston, International Security 19, no. 4 (1995): 36, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539119 
12 David S. Yost, “The French Way of War,” in Nuclear Strategy And National Style 
Volume 2, Appendices National Strategic Style: Country Studies, July 31, 1981, Defense Technical 
Information Center, accessed May 5, 2014, 59, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a133217.pdf.  
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which he defined as “the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and 
patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have 
acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear 
strategy.”13 
David Jones concurred with Snyder by writing about the inputs of national 
strategic culture at the macro level (history, geography, and social, economic and 
political institutions), and a micro level (military institutions, and their relationship to 
civilian authorities).14 
There were three issues with the first generation of literature on strategic culture. 
According to Johnston, it was all inclusive in terms of the inputs to strategic culture, and 
it did not allow for explanations of a country’s strategic choices to be anything but a 
result of its strategic culture. Second, Johnston argued that the literature of this generation 
implied that since the inputs to strategic culture were rather static, the resulting behavior 
was consistent. Third, Johnston maintained that the literature from this generation 
presented national strategic culture as a singular entity when the inputs were in fact 
diverse.15   
To its credit, the first generation of strategic culture theorists was instrumental in 
drawing attention to the consideration that countries have distinct national strategic styles 
or ways of thinking and dealing with strategic issues. This consideration invited 
additional study and exploration of the field and led to the second generation of literature 
on strategic culture. 
                                                 
13 Jack L. Snyder, “The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options,” accessed 28 
April 2014, http://130.154.3.14/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2005/R2154.pdf.  
14 Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” 37. 
15 Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” 36–37. 
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b. The Second Generation of Literature on Strategic Culture 
This generation of literature dates back to the middle of the 1980s, and is 
characterized by certain writings by Bradley Klein and Colin Gray.16  This generation of 
scholars studied the distinction between the strategic message—what national leaders say 
about their actions to justify them—and how they acted (national behavior) to defend 
national interests. Klein—one of the foremost scholars of this generation—wrote about 
strategic culture as a legitimizing instrument (based on historic usage) for national leaders 
to justify actions inconsistent with shared national beliefs and assumptions but consistent 
with the pursuit of national interests. Bradley Klein still considered strategic culture as a 
product of a nation’s history, as did theorists of the first generation.17   
According to Johnston, a key criticism of this second generation of literature was 
its inability to consistently link strategic culture to national behavior. In other words, 
though leaders and the elites of a country may view strategic culture merely as a guiding 
tool to legitimize more realist, even hegemonic, pursuits of national interests, they cannot 
be counted on to consistently behave this way because they often align their actions with 
their national strategic culture—perhaps to appear nationally oriented.18 
Colin Gray rejected Johnston’s assessment of the first and second generations of 
strategic culture theory. In Gray’s view, strategic culture should not be distinguished 
from strategic behavior, and one should not interpret all strategic behavior as influenced 
solely by culture—rather one should see strategic culture “as a context out there that 
surrounds, and gives meaning to, strategic behavior.”19  In other words, strategic culture 
is the national context that states use to shape their behavior based on the strategic 
environment and prevailing circumstances.   
                                                 
16 Bradley S. Klein, “Hegemony and Strategic Culture:  American Power Projection and Alliance 
Defence Politics,” Review of International Studies, 14, no. 2 (1988): 136–139, 
http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/pdfplus/10.2307/20097137.pdf?acceptTC=true. 
Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style (Lanham, MD:  Hamilton Press, 1986). 
17 Klein, “Hegemony and Strategic Culture,” 136–139.  
18 Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” 39–40. 
19 Colin S. Gray, “The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back,” Review of International Studies 25, 
no. 1 (1999): 53–54, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097575.  
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c. The Third Generation of Literature on Strategic Culture 
The third generation of literature on strategic culture dates primarily during the 
1990s, and it was greatly influenced by constructivist theorists of the period. Alexander 
Wendt, for example, argued on behalf of the liberal view that “international institutions 
can transform state identities and interest.”20  This literature portrayed strategic culture as 
socially constructed, and used it to explain strategic behavior that proved inexplicable by 
realist international relations theory. For example, Peter J. Katzenstein argued that states 
and other actors in the international system construct an identity that shapes their national 
security policy and subsequent strategic behavior.21   
Alastair Johnston takes an empirical approach to explaining strategic culture, as 
was characteristic of the third generation. He argues that strategic culture is a system 
synergistically supported by two groups of assumptions—higher strategic assumptions 
(about the international environment and war) and lower operational assumptions about 
the efficacy of strategic options in relation to a spectrum of national threats (low to high). 
Consistent with constructivist thought, Johnston argues that states’ strategic behavior is 
the result of their higher level strategic assumptions shaped by history; and their lower 
level assumptions about the best strategic options for operating in the rules-based 
international regime.22 
Colin Gray criticizes Johnston’s approach to strategic culture, which distinguishes 
strategic culture from strategic behavior for the purpose of study. Gray argues that 
Johnston’s definition of strategic culture is “driven by the needs of theory building rather 
than by the character of the subject.” In Gray’s view, this is misleading since “strategic 
culture is not only ‘out there,’ also it is within us; we, our institutions, and our behavior, 
are the context.”23  Gray holds that strategic culture is not just the driver of a higher level 
                                                 
20 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” 
International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 394, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706858.  
21 Peter J. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 4. 
22 Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” 46–48. 
23 Gray, “The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back,” 53–54.   
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of assumptions but is also the product of assumptions, and is inherent in the strategic 
behavior generated by such assumptions.  
2. Organizational Culture 
Much has been written about culture at the organizational level. Some scholars—
for example, Kim S. Cameron and Robert E. Quinn—argue that while culture is 
considered abstract, its characteristics or symptoms are identifiable and conducive to 
analysis. They developed the Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) 
using a values approach to assess how an organization perceives success—a perception 
which drives how it plans, structures and manages itself.24  Another prominent scholar in 
the field of organizational theory, Edgar Schein, defines organizational culture as a 
“pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved its problems 
of external adaptation and internal integration, which has worked well enough to be 
considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to 
perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems.”25  A review of the many works on 
the subject suggests that there are two major challenges: defining organizational culture 
with sufficient precision, and then studying organizational culture.   
a. Approaches to Defining Organizational Culture 
According to Edgar Schein, there are different approaches to defining or 
describing organizational culture evident in research on the subject. Approaches to 
defining or describing organizational culture include but are not limited to focusing on 
group behavioral trends, and group norms—encompassing customs and rituals, group 
values and aspirations, common skills, methods and competencies, common paradigms of 
thought, agreed languages, and shared meanings.26 
                                                 
24 Kim S. Cameron and Robert E Quinn, Diagnosing and Changing Organizational Culture: Based 
On the Competing Values Framework (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2006), 31. 
25 Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 3rd Edition (San Francisco, CA: Jossey 
Bass, 2004), 4. 
26 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 12–13.  
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 1. Group Behavioral Trends:  In what can be termed the behavioral trend 
approach scholars Michael Jones, Michael Moore, and Richard Snyder attempt to define 
culture in terms of how people behave and interact in an organization, and the customs 
and conventions they develop and follow to govern those interactions over time.27 
2. Group Norms:  The group norms approach—which also includes customs and 
rituals – defines culture in terms of customs—that is, the recognized recurring behavior 
and activities of its members. George Homans writes that the recurring activities of 
groups when recognized as such constitute customs, which over time become implicitly 
accepted and practiced by the members of that group.28  
3. Group Values and Aspirations:  Terrence Deal and Allan Kennedy view culture 
in terms of group values and aspirations. They describe or define culture in groups in 
terms of what each particular group advertises or claims that it is trying to attain, produce 
or influence in its field of endeavor.29 
4. Common Skills, Methods and Competencies: Thomas Peters and Robert 
Waterman define culture in terms of the mostly unwritten common skills, methods and 
competencies ingrained in how an organization or group accomplishes tasks that allow it 
to thrive and remain vibrant in its field. In their study of America’s best-run companies 
Peters and Waterman learned that some of the top performing companies at the time 
(their book was originally published in 1982) viewed success in innovation as a “numbers 
game.” This meant that the more attempts at innovation the greater the probability of 
success, and so these companies instituted innovation in their daily operations, and as a 
competency among their employees.30 
 
                                                 
27 Michael Owen Jones, Michael Dane Moore, and Richard Christopher Snyder, Inside Organizations: 
Understanding the Human Dimension (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1988). 
28 George C. Homans, The Human Group (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950), 28 
29 Terrence E. Deal, and Allan A Kennedy, The New Corporate Cultures: Revitalizing the Workplace 
After Downsizing, Mergers, and Reengineering (Massachusetts:  Perseus Books, 1999).  
30 Thomas J. Peters, and Robert H Waterman, In Search of Excellence: Lessons From America’s Best-
run Companies (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), 208. 
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5. Common Paradigm of Thought and Language:  Geert Hofstede defined culture 
in terms of the common framework that guides the way in which the members of a group 
perceive, think and speak in solving the challenges of daily life. This framework is 
essentially a common cognitive pattern that the members of that group reinforce and 
teach to new members as the way to see, think and act. According to Hofstede, “every 
person carries within him- or herself patterns of thinking, feeling and potential acting that 
were learned throughout the person’s lifetime.”  In Hofstede’s view, this guides a 
person’s actions in much the same way as a computer’s software guides its functions.31 
6. Shared Meanings:  The “shared meanings” approach defines culture in terms of 
the shared meanings that groups assign to phenomena based on internal and external 
interactions. Karl Weick writes that these shared meanings help groups make sense of 
phenomena. Calling it “sensemaking,” he states that it is “tested to the extreme when 
people encounter an event whose occurrence is so implausible that they hesitate to report 
it for fear they will not be believed.”32  In other words, shared meaning is how a group 
makes sense of things, and it is challenged when anomalies—things that have not been 
commonly experienced by the group—occur.  
b. Approaches to Studying Culture 
There are basically three social scientific approaches to studying culture which 
shape the collection and analysis of cultural data during research; they are integration, 
differentiation and fragmentation. Joanne Martin and Edgar Schein highlight this 
observation in their works.33 
1. Integration:  According to Martin, this approach to studying culture is 
identifiable in terms of the following characteristics:  manifestations of the culture being 
researched and studied all reinforce the same themes; “all members of the organization 
are said to share in an organization wide consensus,” and there is no ambiguity in the 
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33 Joanne Martin, Cultures in Organizations: Three Perspectives (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1992), 12–13. 
 11
culture.34  This approach is evident in Edgar Schein’s previously cited definition of 
culture as a set of shared beliefs and assumptions.  
2. Differentiation:  Research and study of culture from a differentiation 
perspective asserts that manifestations of culture (for example, espoused values and 
practices) are inconsistent; in other words, they don’t necessarily reinforce the same 
themes.35  Martin writes that this approach holds that clear, sometimes consistent 
manifestations of culture can happen but only within sub-cultures where there is less 
ambiguity than in the broader culture.36 
3. Fragmentation:  The fragmentation perspective emphasizes a situation or case-
centric study of culture based on the premise that culture is ambiguous. According to 
Martin, this approach asserts that manifestations of culture can be consistent or 
inconsistent with cultural themes based on the individual situation.37  The fragmentation 
approach is evident in Karl Weick’s view of culture in terms of sense-making because it 
similarly advocates a situation- or interaction-centric approach to the study of culture.  
D. U.S. SECURITY STRATEGY AND U.S. ARMY TRANSFORMATION 
U.S. security strategy shapes Army transformation. The culture that drives both 
U.S. security strategy and Army transformation influences and shapes the changes 
required for an RMA. This thesis examines U.S. security strategy and Army 
transformation—highlighting the relationship—to observe the cultural influences that 
support or hamper change vital to an RMA.  
1. The Interwar Period 
There is a considerable amount of literature on U.S. strategy and military 
innovation during the interwar period. Some studies provide observations on the 
influence of U.S. strategic culture on the change required for an RMA. Historians 
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Williamson Murray and Allan Millet, David Khan, and Calvin Christman, among others, 
have written about the prevalent strategic thought in the United States during the interwar 
period. Chapter II of the thesis explores the influence of this aspect of U.S. strategic 
culture on the RMA. 
a. Strategy 
Strategy is the management of resources to realize objectives. According to Carl 
Builder, “a strategy is a concept for relating means to ends.”38 U.S. strategy in the 
interwar period can be described as one in which the means to realize America’s strategic 
goals, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, were for the greater part of the period 
outpaced by the requirements inherent in said objectives. For example, the United States 
defended the Philippines during the interwar period as part of its overall strategic goal of 
maintaining its influence and trade access in the Western Pacific. However, Congress 
mandated force reductions that undermined this strategic goal. According to Brian Linn, 
in the 1920 Defense Act Congress rejected Army Chief of Staff Peyton C. March’s plan 
for “a peacetime complement of 509,000 men, in which the Philippine and Hawaiian 
departments would each be separate tactical commands of some 22,000.”39  Not only 
were the requisite forces for the realization of U.S. strategic aims in the Pacific denied, 
but Congress mandated the reduction of existing forces from “13,251 in the Philippines, 
and 15,368 in Hawaii in 1921 to 11,808 and 13,096 respectively in 1924.”  These low 
force levels would not see a steady increase until the mid to late 1930s.40  The 
relationship between strategic aims and means holds implications for the RMA in terms 
of the required factors of change that are cultivated, which include funding, manning, and 
innovation.   
                                                 
38 Carl Builder, The Masks of War:  American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis (Baltimore, 
MD:  The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 49.  
39 Brian McAllister Linn, Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902–1940 (Chapel 
Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 146. 
40 Linn, Guardians of Empire,146. 
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b. U.S. Army Transformation 
The literature on U.S. Army transformation in the interwar period can be 
classified into two perspectives: some argue that U.S. defense spending reductions 
hamstrung innovation, and others maintain that the Army’s culture was primarily 
responsible for hampering innovation. David Johnston contends that the poor state of 
Army readiness at the start of World War II was due not so much to the fiscally 
parsimonious character of interwar U.S. national security strategy, but rather to the 
Army’s organizational culture, which repressed innovation in favor of traditional doctrine 
and concepts.41  Brian Linn argued similarly, and wrote that Army preparedness in the 
Pacific was challenged by “well-conceived ideas falling victim to institutional 
inertia…parochialism, paranoia, tunnel vision, face-saving, egotism, and accidents of 
timing.”42 
In contrast, Paul Kennedy points out that U.S. defense spending was 
comparatively lower than that of Britain, Japan and other major powers for much of the 
interwar period, and that this severely limited U.S. military readiness at the start of World 
War II.43   
2. Contemporary Period since the Iraq War 
Much has been written on the challenges of formulating a U.S. defense strategy in 
a post-Cold War strategic environment in which threats are ambiguous—compared to the 
singular threat-based defense planning environment of the Cold War in which (aside from 
conflicts in Korea and Vietnam) U.S. Army strategists focused on preparedness to fight 
the Soviet Union in Europe. The literature acknowledges in varying ways the influence of 
aspects of contemporary U.S. strategic and Army organizational culture in realizing the 
changes required for an RMA. 
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a. Strategy 
Some experts have compared the ambiguity of the contemporary period’s 
strategic environment to that of the interwar period—a clear contrast to the singular 
dominant threat environment of the Cold War. In 2014, John Peters and his co-authors 
wrote that “the adversaries and the missions that the Army must be prepared for are more 
ambiguous and diverse than at any time since the period between the World Wars.”44  
Additionally, the 2013 Army Strategic Guidance concurs that “the emerging environment 
presents a complex range of threats, challenges and opportunities, making it likely that U.S. 
forces will be called on to operate under a broad variety of conditions.”45 The current 
administration’s national security strategy similarly acknowledges the contemporary 
challenges, and emphasizes a multilateral security strategy (with the United States 
working to build security in close cooperation with its allies), and technological 
innovation to maintain America’s military and economic primacy.46 
b. U.S. Army Transformation 
The literature on Army transformation in the contemporary period can be 
classified into two schools based on the debate surrounding the realization of an RMA. 
These two schools are largely influenced by aspects of U.S. strategic culture such as the 
national cognitive style (explored in Chapter III). Norman Davis, John Arquilla, and 
David Ronfeldt contend that a revolution in military affairs is ongoing with an impending 
culmination.47 Other RMA proponents, including Peter Singer, concur that “just as 
submarines, tanks, and airplanes disrupted tactics, doctrine and organizational identity in 
the early 20th century, so today we are struggling with deep changes wrought by the likes 
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of drones, cyber and lasers.”48  RMA critics like Michael O’Hanlon and Stephen Biddle 
challenge the arguments and hypotheses of RMA proponents.49 Biddle, for example, 
argued in 2004 that, while “change of course is inevitable…expectations of a looming 
revolution in military affairs are both a serious misreading of modern military history and 
a dangerous prescription for today’s defense policy.”50   Other literature on the subject 
focuses on phenomena inherent in the RMA debate like the factors and direction of 
innovation. For example, James Russell argues that innovation can begin at the lower 
(tactical and operational) levels of the Army and progress upwards as a result of war-
induced factors that drive units to adapt their doctrine, organization and equipment.51 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The research relies on comparative historical study to analyze the U.S. strategic 
culture and U.S. Army organizational culture during the interwar period and the present 
period in order to highlight cultural and organizational factors that may hinder the future 
realization of an RMA. William Sewell Jr. wrote that Marc Bloch believed that “history 
cannot be intelligible unless it can ‘succeed in establishing explanatory relationships 
between phenomena.’”52  By comparing cultural and organizational factors of change at 
the strategic and army levels in the interwar and contemporary periods this thesis sheds 
light on the factors that can challenge or promote the successful cultivation of an RMA. 
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F. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This introductory chapter has discussed the nature of the research inquiry, and 
identified the definitions, concepts and frameworks used in the ensuing chapters. The rest 
of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter II considers how the U.S. strategic culture 
and U.S. Army organizational culture of the interwar years affected the cultivation of a 
Revolution in Military Affairs, given the emergence of new technologies. Chapter III 
analyzes the extent to which the U.S. strategic culture and U.S. Army organizational 
culture of the contemporary period support the pursuit of a Revolution in Military 
Affairs. Chapter IV fulfills the goal of this thesis research by comparing the findings 
from Chapters II and III, and suggesting options for the management of constructive 
change. Chapter V sums up the principal findings and concludes with recommendations 
for further study.   
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II. INFLUENCE OF INTERWAR CULTURE ON THE 
REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS 
This chapter examines how culture at the strategic and U.S. Army organizational 
levels influenced the changes required for a Revolution in Military Affairs. The role of 
this chapter is to highlight the influence of culture at both levels on change. This is 
essential for a comparison to culture in the contemporary period—that is, since the 2011 
U.S. withdrawal from Iraq to the present. This chapter examines U.S. strategic culture 
within the context of domestic politics and policymaking institutions, the American way 
of war, national cognitive style, and presidential preferences for force and diplomacy. 
U.S. Army culture will be examined through the lenses of doctrine, organization, training 
and materiel as units of organizational culture in the interwar era.   
A. STRATEGIC CULTURE 
In his analysis of military innovation in the interwar period, historian Allan 
Millett wrote that “there are four central problems in assessing interwar military 
innovation. The first is determining the influence of strategic context.”53  U.S strategic 
culture influences the change necessary for a Revolution in Military Affairs. The 
influence of strategic culture or the strategic context on the change necessary for an RMA 
is evident in the domestic politics and policymaking institutions of the interwar era. This 
influence is also evident in the American way of war, the national cognitive style relative 
to innovation, and the presidential preferences for the use of force and diplomacy in the 
interwar period. 
1.  Interwar Era U.S. Politics, Defense Policy and the RMA 
Domestic politics influences and shapes U.S. security policy; both control the 
level and availability of resources, and create institutional stimuli vital to the change 
required for an RMA. The domestic political environment influences U.S. security 
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policy, and by extension the change factors critical to realizing an RMA. Public opinion 
and voting determine the members of the U.S. Congress, and by extension shape and 
direct U.S. security policy, and the resources available for military innovation and 
experimentation. 
The domestic political environment influences security policy by the localized 
pressure it exerts on the elected members of the political institutions that formulate such 
policies. As noted above, public opinion and voting determine the composition and the 
spectrum of views in the Executive and the Legislature. In Congress’ case, legislators can 
shape policies supportive of an RMA in terms of directing the military to implement 
administrative and organizational changes, and providing or withholding the monetary 
resources vital to research, development, testing, procurement and doctrinal 
reorganization. Congressional legislation on budget, economic and other issues shapes 
the funding and technical expertise required for the realization of an RMA.   
Domestic politics in the interwar period did not create conditions supportive of 
the changes required for an RMA. Domestic politics—influenced by the economic 
challenges of the Great Depression—fostered a parsimonious approach to national 
security strategy in Congress that drastically reduced U.S. forces as well as War 
Department funding for research and procurement post World War I. According to Allan 
R. Millett and his co-authors, Congress believed the nation did not need a large active 
duty post war force so it denied the Army’s request for 500,000 active duty troops, and 
opted for an active force of 280,000 in the 1920 National Defense Act.54  Millet and his 
co-authors write that congressionally mandated spending cuts further “limited the Army 
to developing weapons prototypes:  it did not have enough money to reequip its field 
forces to contemporary European standards.”55   
Amidst the defense budget cuts Congress passed the Air Corps Act in 1926. This 
set the Air Corps as a separate branch within the Army, and authorized a 1,800 airplane 
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modernization plan.56  This also helped improve air capability in the Army but not 
enough to mitigate the force reduction and the lack of modern equipment to replace 
obsolete World War I gear.   
The Army was not the only service affected by lack of congressional resourcing. 
Millett and his co-authors write that Congress “declined to modernize the aging 
Destroyer force, approving only eight of the twenty-eight destroyers the Navy wanted to 
replace.”57   The reduction in funding for forces and equipment hampered doctrinal and 
organizational changes. Millett and his co-authors write that the Navy was unable to 
experiment with and test a new amphibious doctrine propounded by the United States 
Marine Corps under its Commandant at the time Major General John A. Lejeune because 
“it did not have the transports and landing craft…to make an amphibious landing a 
bearable risk.”58  
The Congressionally mandated force and budget reductions of the interwar period 
denied resources vital for development, and for experimentation with doctrine, 
organization and technology—vital change factors in realizing an RMA. The strategic 
culture of the United States is characterized by a system of government in which the 
elected representatives of the people control the resources critical for the changes 
supportive of an RMA. The influence of domestic politics on the United States Congress 
shapes the level of resources available for military innovation and experimentation. 
The strategic net assessments of the interwar era failed to stimulate Congress to 
make a level of investment in military capability development congruent with deterring 
and defeating a potential adversary like Japan or Germany at the onset of war. A vital 
relationship exists between strategic net assessments of peers and adversaries and 
military capability development in a nation. Allan Millett concurs that “the history of the 
interwar period does demonstrate a relationship between strategic net assessment and 
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changes in military capability.”59  In other words, strategic net assessments greatly 
influenced defense policy during the interwar era.  Assessments partially explain the level 
of RMA-supportive resources made available or withheld to the Armed Services during 
the period. It appears that policymakers in Congress and the Executive arm of the U.S. 
government were not as concerned about the United States’ economic and military 
capabilities relative to the capabilities of potential adversaries—this was particularly 
evident in the case of Japan. Historian David Kahn assessed that U.S. policy makers in 
the interwar period did not consider the developing defense capabilities of potential 
adversaries. Kahn writes that “in designing and procuring military forces…matters as 
whether Germany had 100 divisions or 300 and whether Japan had 10 carriers or 20 were 
not even raised when policy-makers examined the basic issues of strategy.”60  In an 
investigative study of U.S. government strategic net assessments during the interwar 
years, Calvin Christman found that U.S. strategy formulation was adversely impacted by 
an absence of information linkage between the Joint Army-Navy Board—responsible to 
both Department Secretaries for strategic net assessments and operational planning—and 
U.S. foreign policymakers, the president and the Secretary of State.61  This meant that 
critical strategic net assessments were not getting to policy makers, who in turn were not 
furnishing policy aims and directives to military planners.   
The Joint Army Navy Board was responsible for providing strategic net 
assessments and developing war plans to deal with potential U.S. adversaries like Japan. 
According to Calvin Christman, War Plan Orange was the Joint Board plan for fighting 
Japan and it called for the Army’s defense against an initial Japanese attack on the 
Philippines while the Navy fought and destroyed the Japanese Navy enroute to relieve the 
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Army.62  Christman wrote that for a successful naval maneuver to the Philippines, War 
Plan Orange required “advanced bases in the mandated islands…to be seized, and neither 
the army nor the Marines had the necessary troops to seize them.”63  Previous force and 
budget reductions had effectively reduced the force capabilities vital to defend U.S. 
interests in the Pacific according to War Plan Orange. The plan’s requirements and 
strategic assessments failed to remedy this. In other words, the military’s inability to 
execute War Plan Orange did not convince U.S. policymakers to invest resources to 
balance national strategic goals in the Pacific with military means. Congress’ vote to 
deny the Navy’s proposed Guam project in 1938—a project involving the construction of 
bases on Guam for air and naval units that could reinforce the U.S. presence in the Pacific 
and America’s ability to defend the Philippines—indicates that isolationists in that 
policymaking body, though appraised of strategic assessments, failed to respond 
favorably with resources facilitative of the changes necessary for an RMA. 
2. The American Way of War and the RMA (Interwar Period) 
How America perceives, prepares, fights and ends wars is part of its strategic 
culture; it is a unit of analysis of the overall strategic cultural construct, and has been 
referred to as the American Way of War. Phillip Meilinger agrees that America’s 
“approach to war has developed in its own distinctive way.”64  The American Way of 
War impacts and shapes factors of change critical to the realization of an RMA—funding, 
military manning, organization, doctrine, and technological innovation. Meilinger 
concurs that strategic cultural analysis in this regard is important and “must be attempted 
because the influence of culture is fundamental to a vast panorama of military art—from 
strategic communication to order and discipline.”65 According to Meilinger, the 
American approach to war in the contemporary period is historically characterized by a 
peacetime preference for small, standing armies that can be rapidly mobilized, enlarged 
                                                 
62 Christman, “Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Craft of Strategic Assessment,” 238–239. 
63 Christman, “Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Craft of Strategic Assessment,” 240. 
64 Phillip S. Meilinger, “American Military Culture and Strategy,” Joint Force Quarterly. no. 46 
(2007): 80.   
65 Meilinger, “American Military Culture and Strategy,” 80. 
 22
with reserve and National Guard forces, fight quick and decisive battles, and demobilize 
at war’s end.66 
The American way of war is characterized by interwar congressional parsimony 
toward the military, particularly the Army that goes back to the nation’s origins. This 
trend has historical and even constitutional roots, but it hinders pursuing changes required 
for an RMA. America traditionally pursued drastic reductions in forces and defense 
budgets after wars that reduce investment in innovation and experimentation—both of 
which are vital to realizing an RMA. Writing on the influence of society on the military 
during the course of U.S. history, Millett and his co-authors assert that Americans’ “fear 
of large standing forces” has been one of the factors that have “at various times imposed 
severe limitations on the availability of monetary and manpower resources.”67 Article I of 
the U.S. Constitution encourages this ad hoc and socially reinforced congressional 
approach to Army readiness by stipulating that “Congress shall have the power…to raise 
and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer 
Term than two Years.”68  The implication here is that Congress is expected to constantly 
reevaluate the need for an Army and expand and reduce it when adjustments are deemed 
necessary. The U.S. Constitution reinforces and perpetuates a Congressional and national 
perception that the Army is to be retrograded between wars, and rapidly upgraded to fight 
and decisively win wars. In the interwar period this perception did not support 
maintaining the U.S. Army as a professional and well equipped force, adequately sized 
and resourced to meet the nation’s strategic objectives. As mentioned in the last chapter, 
Congress chose not to fund the 509,000-man Army proposed by Army Chief of Staff 
Peyton March in the Baker-March bill. Consistent with the long-established American 
Way of War Congress did not see the need for a large standing army after World War I, 
regardless of the strategic commitments of the day or mobilization lessons of that 
conflict. David Johnson concurs that interwar “Congressional attitudes reflected two 
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fundamental American traditions:  distrust of large standing armies and an unswerving 
belief in the preeminence of the citizen soldier. The U.S. National Army had mobilized 
when it was needed and demobilized when the emergency had passed—just as it always 
had.”69  
3. Force and Diplomacy in U.S. Foreign Policy and the RMA 
Presidential preferences for the use of force in relation to diplomacy in U.S. 
foreign and security policy can shape the changes required for an RMA. Factors such as 
military funding and manning are critical to realizing an RMA, and are tied to the 
strategic preference of presidents for force and diplomacy in pursuit of U.S. strategic 
goals. The executive bureaucracy is a highly specialized arm of the U.S. government 
tasked with providing information and policy options to the president in specific areas of 
responsibility—for example, the Department of Defense on the use of force, and the 
Department of State on the use of diplomacy. Presidents assume office with their own 
distinct personalities, preferences and world views which shape their perceptions and 
their decisions about considerations of policy inputs regarding the use of force and 
diplomacy in international affairs. Steven Hook argues that a president’s preference for 
force or diplomacy is based on his “operational code”—a confluence of “principled 
beliefs regarding the virtues and limitations of human nature, the proper roles of 
government and…national…and global problems,” as well as “causal beliefs about the 
best means available for solving these problems.”70 A president’s operational code with 
regard to force and diplomacy shapes the level of investment he is willing to make in 
changes required for an RMA. 
The interwar period, from 1919 up to America’s entry into World War II in 1941, 
was marked by the Presidencies of Woodrow Wilson from 1913 to 1921, Warren G. 
Harding from 1921 to 1923, Calvin Coolidge from 1923 to 1929, Herbert Hoover from 
1929 to 1933, and Franklin D. Roosevelt from 1933 to 1945. Each president’s preference 
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for the use of force and diplomacy in pursuing U.S. strategic aims helps explain how key 
elements of change required for an RMA—including defense funding and manning—
fared during the interwar years. 
President Woodrow Wilson was averse to the use of force even when it was 
supported by public opinion, and instrumental to furthering his views on international 
norms and influencing the strategic behavior of foreign governments. He strongly 
preferred diplomacy to force as the means of realizing U.S. foreign policy objectives. 
According to Arthur Walworth, during the crisis with Mexico involving the military junta 
of General Huerta “Wilson reluctantly reached the conclusion that force must be used to 
dislodge Huerta, but he hoped that it would not have to be the force of the United States.”  
To this end, Walworth wrote, Wilson lifted an existing U.S. arms embargo on Mexico 
that permitted the flow of arms to Venustiano Carranza, who was fighting against 
Huerta.71 Writing on Woodrow Wilson’s outlook on war and diplomacy, Walworth stated 
that the president “gave consideration to both disarmament and arbitration as means to 
peace. Though he said little or nothing in public about disarmament, he talked with Sir 
William Tyrrell of the necessity of curbing armaments.”72   
It is thus unsurprising, given Wilson’s preference for diplomacy, that the Army 
was small, and unprepared in terms of equipment at the start of World War I. Dwight D. 
Eisenhower wrote that the interwar Army under Wilson’s administration was modest in 
size; “its total strength in the spring of 1915 was approximately 120,000.”73 Writing 
about war mobilization on America’s entry into World War I in 1917, Eisenhower stated 
“as usual, our country was sadly—close to totally—unprepared. While we had mobilized 
a few more regular regiments in 1916, the strength of the Regular Army was awfully 
small. Intensive efforts had to start at once to bring our strength up.”74 Walworth adds 
                                                 
71 Arthur Walworth, Woodrow Wilson, 2nd ed.  (Boston MA:  Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), 369. 
 
72 Walworth, Woodrow Wilson, 378. 
73 Dwight D. Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories I tell to Friends (New York:  Doubleday & Company Inc, 
1967), 33.  
74 Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories I tell to Friends, 127. 
 25
that “there was no Army to send. German military experts ranked the force of the United 
States on a level with those of tiny nations.”75 
President Harding’s post war administration pursued a security policy consistent 
with the American post war tradition of military downsizing. According to Robert K. 
Murray, President Harding came into office on a campaign promise to return America to 
“normalcy.”76  Though Harding was a supporter of the Navy and wanted to continue the 
1916 Naval Shipbuilding program, he was politically bound by campaign promises and 
the strong influence of politically powerful disarmament proponents in Congress like 
Senator William Borah (R-Idaho).77  Thus, Harding’s administration diplomatically 
strove to maintain international order and balance through disarmament, particularly in 
the maritime domain. The disarmament treaties signed during Harding’s administration 
reduced the strength of the Navy and limited technological and organizational innovation 
by restricting the type and quantity of ships the United States Navy could muster relative 
to signatory countries like Britain and Japan. According to David Johnson, the 1921 
Washington, Disarmament conference “resulted in nine separate treaties that limited 
naval armaments and addressed tensions in the pacific and China.”78  
President Calvin Coolidge’s administration (1923–1929) carried out a limited 
development of the U.S. Navy to meet the nation’s strategic maritime interests and 
expanded American airpower, but continued the reduction of Army ground forces 
pursued by the Harding administration. The administration increased the Navy consistent 
with the limitations of the Washington Disarmament Conference to protect America’s 
strategic interests in the Pacific. This was because Coolidge’s administration was 
concerned about growing Japanese naval power and strategic interests in the Pacific 
relative to U.S. trade and political interests. Millet wrote that the Coolidge administration 
assigned both newly completed aircraft carriers (USS Lexington and USS Saratoga) to 
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the Pacific in 1928.79 Coolidge in concert with Congress worked to strengthen the Navy. 
According to Millett and his co-authors, “Navy planners argued that the ten light cruisers 
on duty did not meet the long-range requirements of a war with Japan. Congress 
approved a force of eight heavy or ‘treaty’ cruisers (8 inch guns, 10,000 guns) in 1924.”80  
Additionally, the Coolidge administration tried to balance against potential threats by 
investing in emerging airplane technology. According to Millett and his co-authors, in 
1926 Coolidge signed the Air Corps Act into law, “which… provided for a force of 1,514 
officers, 16,000 men and 1,800 planes, which would be modernized by a five-year 
expansion and modernization program.”81  
President Coolidge was averse to maintaining the peacetime ground forces 
deemed necessary by the Army’s leadership to meet the nation’s strategic obligations and 
war readiness. According to David Johnson, “Coolidge’s avowed domestic program was 
to reduce government expenditures and enable a tax reduction, and his foreign policy 
focused on international disarmament. War Department pleas for a larger Army were 
contrary to both programs.”82  Thus, budget cuts during Coolidge’s administration would 
reduce the army to about 130,000.83 Johnson adds that in a speech delivered in 1925, 
President Coolidge expressed doubts as to whether the post-World War I strategic 
environment warranted the budget requirements of the War Department, and stated that 
“the turning of such resources into the making of good roads, the building of better 
homes, the promotion of education and all the others [sic] arts of peace which ministry to 
the advancement of human welfare.”84 
The Hoover Presidential administration (1929 to 1933) preferred diplomacy to 
force as a way to preserve U.S. strategic interests. Consistent with this outlook, Herbert 
Hoover cut back on the naval shipbuilding plans of the Coolidge administration, and 
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maintained the peacetime trend of reduced Army budgets. According to Millett and his 
co-authors, in addition to agreeing to further limits to naval shipbuilding at the 1930 
London Conference with Britain and Japan, the Hoover administration opposed the 1929 
shipbuilding program. Millett and his co-authors added that under Hoover, “the United 
States agreed to cut its heavy-cruiser program to eighteen ships within a 180,000-ton 
ceiling…and funding for manning the fleet, operations, maintenance, and modernization 
dropped about 20 percent below the funds actually authorized in 1922.”85 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration (1933 to 1945) sought to reverse 
the disarmament and military resource deprivation of the Hoover administration. This 
was consistent with events in the global strategic environment (including the ascendance 
to power of Adolf Hitler in 1933 and German rearmament).   Millett and his co-authors 
note that “after more than a decade of limiting its armed forces through international 
agreement and unilateral fiscal action, the United States in 1933 began to rearm.” An 
early example was Roosevelt’s 1933 public works allocation of $238 million for building 
“two carriers, four cruisers and twenty destroyers” over three years.86  Johnson observes 
that Roosevelt also wanted to greatly expand American airpower, and that he pursued a 
6,000 airplane development plan by 1939 on the recommendation of the War 
Department.87 
Presidents during the interwar period (1919–1941) favored or preferred 
diplomacy to force in U.S. foreign and security policy. Where force was considered as an 
instrument of national power it was usually in the maritime domain, because as this was 
most crucial to preserving U.S. strategic interests in the contested Pacific (Britain and 
Japan). The presidents during this period—with the exception of Roosevelt—sought to 
either build or preserve disarmament agreements, concluded mostly with Britain and 
Japan, but were also concerned about preserving America’s strategic and economic 
interests in the Far East, particularly against growing Japanese influence. This strategic 
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concern drove presidents—with the exception of Hoover—to build U.S. naval strength 
while subscribing to the American tradition of keeping small peacetime armies.   
Comparably less resources and fewer personnel were made available to Army 
ground forces despite their role in securing and defending U.S. land bases integral to 
naval power projection in the Pacific (for example, the Philippines). Moreover, it seems 
that there was a strategic perception that outside the coastal defense of the continental 
United States the Army was only needed for colonial constabulary work in the Pacific. 
This perception helped keep the Army underfunded and undermanned. Lack of funding 
clearly hampered efforts to pursue the changes vital to realizing a Revolution in Military 
Affairs in this period. According to Millett and his co-authors, “from 1925 to 1940 the 
War Department spent about … $854 million on weapons procurement and research and 
development; the ground forces received only $344 million of these appropriations, or an 
annual average of $21 million for new procurement.”88  This amount of funding—though 
helpful for research and development of new equipment like the M1 Garand rifle, the 105 
mm howitzer, and the 60 and 81 mm mortars—was insufficient for refitting the interwar 
Army to keep pace with European armies.89 
4. The National Cognitive Style and the RMA (Interwar Era) 
Societies have different cognitive styles, which affects the way they approach and 
deal with the organizational, doctrinal and technological changes required for an RMA. 
According to Adamsky, “the theory of cognitive styles has much to contribute in 
explaining the sources of disparities in intellectual approaches to military innovations.”90  
According to Geert Hofstede, cognitive styles or patterns guide people’s behavior in 
much the same way as a computer’s software guides its functions; such patterns guide the 
way in which the members of a group perceive, think and speak in solving the challenges 
of daily life, and teach new members the way to see, think and act.91  Dima Adamsky 
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concurs with Hofstede’s view that cognitive styles form a framework that shapes how 
people view, process and act regarding information.92  Thus, in a group or a country 
where people for the most part share a common cognitive pattern it stands to reason that 
they will view and react similarly to the concept of an RMA, and to the organizational 
and technological changes integral to realizing an RMA.  
  America has historically displayed what Gerhard Maletzke labels an Anglo-
Saxon cognitive pattern that is “predominantly inductive…thinking within the 
Aristotelian logical tradition.”93 John Mole concurs that “since the renaissance Europe 
has been divided between the pragmatic, empirical, inductive thinking of Anglo-Saxon 
and North Sea cultures and the rationalist, deductive thinking of the rest of the continent. 
Anglo Saxons are uncomfortable with theories and generalizations and concepts. They 
prefer to deal with data.”94  This means that for the most part Americans prefer to 
develop general laws from facts and empirical data—thinking linearly from cause to 
effect.   
According to Adamsky, “cognitive styles vary along the continuum between 
two… opposed patterns:  one grouped under the heading of holistic-dialectical thought 
and the other under the heading of logical-analytical thought.”95  Societies that approach 
technology and organizational change with a holistic-dialectical cognitive style tend to 
view technology in terms of its broader application within a given field; in other words, 
such societies are more apt to examine technology for possible new methods of 
employment that shift the current paradigm of doctrine, organization and theories, as 
opposed to just enhancing performance within it. Holistic-dialectical thought societies are 
better able to infer relationships between technology and potential application methods 
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based on historical events.96 By contrast, societies that favor logical-analytical thought 
tend to view and employ technology in terms of the current doctrine, organization and 
theoretical paradigm or construct.97 Such societies prefer logical incremental 
developments in technology and organizations as opposed to paradigmatic shifts that 
extensively change the accepted norms. 
How the U.S. government and the Army dealt with the technologies that emerged 
from World War I—including the tank, the airplane and the radio—demonstrates a highly 
logical analytical cognitive pattern. The U.S. Army and government of the interwar era, 
consistent with their logical analytical thought pattern, sought to exploit emerging 
technologies in a rational, gradual way within existing organizational and doctrinal 
constructs as opposed to what were seen as disruptive, irrational shifts in the doctrinal 
and organizational paradigm or construct of military affairs.  
Dwight Eisenhower’s experience as a young Captain stationed at Fort Benning 
supports this assessment. According to Eisenhower, he and a colleague at the Infantry 
school—George S. Patton Jr.—took to experimenting with the early generation of slow 
moving tanks to develop a tank doctrine that in essence changed the role of the tank from 
a traditional World War I infantry mobile fire support platform moving at 3 mph to one 
where tanks were faster and more lethal and maneuvered en masse, independent of 
infantry. In Eisenhower’s words, “by making good use of the terrain in advance, tanks 
could break into the enemy’s defensive positions, cause confusion…[and] make possible 
not only advance by infantry but envelopments.”98  After publishing their findings in the 
Cavalry and Infantry journals both future generals were reprimanded by the Commander 
of the Infantry School, Major General Charles S. Farnsworth. Eisenhower wrote that “I 
was told that my ideas were not only wrong but dangerous and that henceforth I was to 
keep them to myself. Particularly, I was not to publish anything incompatible with solid 
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infantry doctrine. If I did, I would be hauled before a court-martial. George, I think, was 
given the same message.”99  
The Army was divided in that some favored research, development and 
experimentation with bold organizational and doctrinal concepts (armored battalions and 
combined arms maneuver) based on the existing tank technology while others felt that the 
technology should conform to and support the existing infantry centric combined arms 
paradigm (which regarded tanks as support weapons meant to crawl behind moving 
infantry as they did in World War I). The latter prevailed when the 1920 National 
Defense Act abolished the tank corps as a separate arm. According to Millett and his co-
authors, “Congress and the General Staff agreed that tanks should support infantry, the 
decisive arm in combat, so tank units joined the regular infantry for training. The doctrine 
for tank use remained wedded to the concepts (and speed) of infantry combat.”100 
Airplane technology fared better with the interwar American logical analytical 
cognitive process. Unlike tanks, airplane technological and doctrinal development post 
World War I was viewed as a logical progression of its wartime performance; it indicated 
potential, though there was still some skepticism. Brigadier General Billy Mitchell was 
among the more famous of the interwar era airpower supporters whose efforts and 
experimentation encouraged the establishment of the Army Air Corps by the 1920 
National Defense Act, and greater investment in airpower.   According to Millett, and his 
co-authors, Mitchell argued, albeit exaggeratedly, “that the airplane would replace the 
battle fleet as the ultimate weapon of coastal defense,” and agitated for a separate Air 
Force.101  The doctrinal role of airpower evolved from reconnaissance and close air 
support in World War I to coastal defense and strategic bombing, which fueled arguments 
for a separate air force. American logical analytical thought featured at this juncture as 
the government and the Army ruled out the possibility of a separate air force – a change 
that would have spurred organizational, doctrinal and technological development of air 
power for strategic bombing, reconnaissance and coastal defense. According to Millett 
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and his co-authors, “military aviation policy did not suffer from official neglect, but the 
consensus within Congress and the executive branch—was that the aviators had not 
discovered an independent mission for themselves.”102 President Coolidge’s Morrow 
Board—a group appointed to evaluate air power development—encouraged the 
development of air power but not an independent air force.103  
B. U.S. ARMY CULTURE AND THE RMA IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD 
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s previously mentioned observation that the Army was 
unprepared at the start of World War II and his experience in trying to promote a new 
tank doctrine and organizational change invite analysis of the Army’s strategic culture 
during the interwar period. This is particularly important for a comparison with 
contemporary Army strategic culture in order to manage potentially harmful recurring 
trends that favor relearning old lessons from the interwar period. The challenge with 
studying culture is adopting suitable units of analysis within the system being analyzed. 
In the case of the interwar U.S. Army this section examines policies affecting the changes 
required for an RMA in the areas of doctrine, organization, and materiel. These areas are 
reliable units of analysis because they are fundamental elements of U.S. Army 
transformation.   
1. Army Doctrine, Change and the RMA in the Interwar Period 
The U.S. Army defines doctrine as the “fundamental principles by which the 
military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It 
is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”104  During the interwar period there 
was general institutional inertia regarding doctrinal experimentation and change—a vital 
requirement for realizing an RMA. There was some innovation with reference to 
emerging tank, airplane and radio technology; but these innovations were coupled with a 
weak institutional effort to study and develop new doctrine. Thus, during the interwar 
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period, the U.S. Army largely sought to integrate emerging technology within existing 
doctrine and the World War I paradigm of military affairs (defensive, infantry-centric 
warfare)  as opposed to seeking out new methods (such as mechanized/motorized 
combined arms maneuver) and organizations (armored and mechanized/motorized 
infantry units) to employ them.  
The Army leadership was basically split between those who believed that what 
worked in World War I ground maneuver was going to work in another war, and thus 
focused more on what was the most difficult lesson learned from World War I—mass 
mobilization—and those who saw greater potential in emerging technology, and urged 
investment in research, procurement, doctrinal experimentation, reform and 
reorganization. David Johnson concurs that “the lessons of the Great War were viewed in 
two fundamentally different ways. Some officers, including Mitchell, saw potential in the 
new weapons. Others, such as John Pershing and Peyton March, were more skeptical. In 
the aftermath of the war, the skeptical view dominated.”105   
The skeptical faction was favored under the Harding and Coolidge presidential 
administrations that spanned the 1920s. According to Millett and his co-authors, in the 
1920 National Defense Act, Congress chose to go with the recommendations of a hired 
expert, Colonel John McAuley Palmer, to reduce the Army to 280,000, which was well 
below the 500,000 man active force recommended by the Secretary of War, Newton 
Baker, and the Army Chief of Staff, Peyton March.106  As part of the reduction Congress 
also mandated the dissolution of the Army’s Tank Corps. This measure subordinated tank 
doctrine to the Commandant of the Infantry School and Ordnance. 
The 1920 Defense Reorganization Act subordinated tank doctrine to an infantry 
establishment that was skeptical of the potential battlefield applications of the new 
technology. The key leaders in the infantry-centric army that won World War I were 
largely intolerant of doctrinal experimentation and change that challenged the existing 
paradigm in which the infantry was the sole decisive force in combat. Tank proponents 
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were censored and repressed. Doctrinal experimentation and change are vital to realizing 
an RMA, while thus institutional repression of experimentation is inimical to promoting 
an RMA. This was, however, the norm in the interwar period. According to Millett and 
his co-authors, “the Army’s halting development of armored forces typified all the 
problems of interwar modernization. By 1920 the wartime Tank Corps of some 5,000 
vehicles and nearly 20,000 officers and men had shrunk to 700 French- and British-model 
tanks and 2,600 soldiers.”107 The disbandment of the Army’s dedicated Tank Corps 
hindered tank doctrinal research, experimentation and development. Bright young 
officers like George Patton and Dwight Eisenhower sought to convince the Army on 
doctrinal reform that would have employed tanks in a more effective role in combined 
arms maneuver, but the Army leadership suppressed their views and censored them. As a 
Major, Dwight Eisenhower was reprimanded about his views on the creation and 
employment of separate tank and mechanized formations (battalions, etc.) in combined 
arms maneuver, and told to support existing doctrine that subordinated tanks to infantry 
to serve as support platforms in infantry maneuver.108 
Like the tank, the airplane at the end of World War I was also viewed within the 
construct of infantry ground support, but was able to transcend this doctrinal role by the 
mid-1920s. This explains the far greater strides in air doctrine and airplane design 
compared to armor. David Johnson concurs that “at the close of WWI, airmen generally 
perceived the principal role of aviation as supporting the ground battle.”109 This changed 
with the efforts of Brigadier General Billy Mitchell and other airpower advocates that 
argued that the air force could operate in doctrinal roles justifying its separation from the 
Army—specifically strategic bombing. The Army and Congress were not convinced, and 
settled for the Army Air Corps as a separate branch of the Army responsible for the 
development of airpower and doctrine. But as airplane technology improved, Army 
aviation officers and the War Department pushed for greater investment in airpower. 
Congress listened, and according to David Johnson, 
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“Congress enacted two bills in 1926, the Air Commerce Act and the Air Corps 
Act. They placed aviation research and development outside of the control of the Army. 
The National Aeronautical Advisory Committee did much of the fundamental research, 
and the Air Corps, unlike the rest of the Army, did not have to rely on the Ordnance 
Department for major equipment items.”110   
2. Army Organization, Change and the RMA in the Interwar Period  
There was significant institutional inertia in the Army when it came to the 
reorganization of ground formations to test and better exploit the possibilities offered by 
emerging technology in ground combat. The skeptical interwar Army leadership won on 
issues that are key to organizational change—a vital component of the RMA.   These 
issues ranged from force manning (overall and especially in the Pacific) to tank and 
amphibious organizational development.    
The American Way of War rejects the concept of large standing armies. It is 
manifested in America’s massive reduction in forces after every war with far reaching 
second and third order effects on organizational change. The interwar period is arguably 
the most glaring example. Millett and his co-authors contend that, “spending only 2 
percent of each tax dollar on the Army, the United States had disarmed itself more 
effectively than the Versailles Treaty disarmed Germany…budgetary pressures kept the 
half-strength regular army at around 130,000 officers and men.”111 This was well below 
the 500,000 man active army requested by General Peyton March and the War 
Department in 1919 and the 280,000 man active force envisioned by the 1920 National 
Defense Act.112   
Evidence of the reduction in forces during this period can be seen in the Army 
forces in the Pacific. Their ability to adapt to the defense of U.S. interests in the 
Philippines and Hawaii against an increasingly belligerent Japan under War Plan Orange 
was consequently compromised. As previously noted, Brian Linn wrote that after the 
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1920 Defense Act “the Regular forces in the Pacific never approached the peacetime 
strength envisioned by General Peyton March. In 1921 the Philippines had a garrison of 
13,251 and Hawaii one of 15,368; three years later their forces totaled 11,808 and 13,096 
respectively.”113  
As previously discussed, Army leaders believed the tank should remain an 
infantry support platform, and did not see the potential for tanks to maneuver in mass 
formations (battalions). The General Staff therefore disbanded the Tank Corps. Millett 
and his co-authors, wrote that, “despite some interesting exercises by two small tank 
battalions…the Tank Corps disappeared after the National Defense Act of 
1920…Congress and the General Staff agreed that tanks should support infantry, the 
decisive arm in combat.”114 One can argue that the Tank Corps (the two initial tank 
battalions) was to combined arms doctrinal and technological research, development, and 
experimentation what the Army Air Corps was to air doctrine and airplane technology. 
The dissolution of the tank corps hindered America’s development of combined arms 
doctrine and tank technology because it was the seed and test bed for research, 
development and experimentation. Dwight Eisenhower and George Patton were the 
commanders of the two small tank battalions previously mentioned. Eisenhower wrote 
about their work. According to Eisenhower, they were constantly experimenting;  
All our experimenting and training took time. If some of the conservatives 
in the War Department had known exactly what we were up to, they might 
have condemned it as a waste of time…the small group around George 
and me knew we were pioneering with a weapon that could change 
completely the strategy and tactics of land warfare...  every mistake we 
made, every correction, every scrap of information was added to World 
War I’s lessons. These were the beginnings of a comprehensive tank 
doctrine that in George Patton’s case would make him a legend.115  
Contrastingly, the German army during this era (also referred to as the 
Reichswehr) under the leadership of Chief of General Staff Hans von Seeckt displayed a 
culture supportive of organizational change for the doctrinal and technological 
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development of combined arms warfare. According to James Corum, von Seeckt believed 
that World War I proved that maneuver was superior to firepower, and he visualized 
future war as a largely mechanized maneuver affair.116 Consistent with his view, Hans 
von Seeckt focused a significant amount of the German Army’s Officer Corps on 
studying World War I, and exploring ideas for improving maneuver doctrine using 
emerging technology. According to Williamson Murray, he tasked over 400 officers with 
combat experience (roughly 10 percent of the Officer Corps organized in different 
committees) to study World War I doctrine and tactics; the result, according to 
Williamson Murray, “was the extraordinary Army Regulation (AR) 487 (‘Leadership and 
Battle with Combined Arms’).”117 This regulation (published from 1921–1923) changed 
the focus of German doctrine from defensive to offensive maneuver, and boldly reformed 
unit formations, maneuver and tactics. For example, according to Corum, AR 487 
reinforced the Reichswehr’s cavalry with observation aircraft, signal and armored car 
battalions, as well as additional infantry, bicycle, and machine gun troops.118 AR 487 
integrated World War I airplane, armor and communications technology into traditional 
units to improve their performance. 
The U.S. Army recognized the importance and relevance of amphibious capability 
to an expeditionary force during the interwar period, but institutional inertia reinforced by 
leadership attitude to change and innovation and external budgetary pressures hindered 
the development of amphibious doctrine, forces and capable equipment for much of the 
interwar period. The War Department and the Army realized that more amphibious forces 
were needed to fulfill American strategic objectives in the Pacific. Leo Daugherty wrote 
that “Army officers during the mid-1920s considered the very likelihood that they would 
have to carry out either an amphibious insertion or landing operations against an 
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entrenched enemy on a hostile shore.”119 Lieutenant General Arthur G. Trudeau, for 
example, stated that the Army leadership “knew that there were problems that might 
require U.S. troops over there [i.e., Asia]…we recognized that, at some time or other, 
there probably would be some problems in the Pacific. Then, in 1936, they [the Japanese] 
went into China on a big scale and the chips were down. It was just a question of 
when.”120 However, the Army would not designate amphibious forces until 1939 when it 
tasked the 3rd Infantry Division to conduct training for amphibious operations.121 
Daugherty cited “the lack of money and public support for the military” as factors 
responsible for the lack of training and readiness; this also hindered innovation and 
development in the realm of amphibious warfare—something that proved critical to 
World War II operations.122    
As previously noted, there was a prevailing consensus among Army leaders of the 
interwar era on the value of developing airpower. The Army Air Corps therefore saw 
greater investment in manning and organization. This increased after the creation of the 
Army Air Corps, and the passage of the 1926 Air Commerce and Air Corps Acts. The 
latter gave more latitude for doctrinal and technological research, development and 
experimentation. Such latitude was denied to the Tank Corps, which was absorbed by the 
Infantry. 
3. Army Materiel, Change and the RMA in the Interwar Period 
Army materiel development and acquisition or procurement policies are a vital 
component of the organizational change required for an RMA. Such policies are shaped 
by the national strategic culture, and by the organizational culture of the Army. Army 
materiel development during the interwar period was challenged by America’s strategic 
tradition of post-war Army drawdowns, and by a general strategic perception of the 
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period that, owing to the cost of World War I, nations would probably no longer resort to 
war as a means to realize their political and strategic goals. The creation of the League of 
Nations and the arms limitation treaties, including the Versailles treaty and the accords 
concluded at the Washington Naval Conference, appear to have reinforced this 
perception.   
The traditional post-war Army drawdown, reinforced by the strategic outlook of 
the interwar Army and national leaders, greatly reduced funding for materiel 
development and procurement for the Army. According to the Richard Stewart and the 
Center of Military History, the 1920 National Defense Act (signed by President Warren 
G. Harding) gave the War Department around roughly “$300 million per year. This was 
about half the estimated cost of fully implementing the force structure authorized in the 
National Defense Act.”123  Additionally, Millet and his co-authors wrote that “from 1925 
until 1940 the War Department spent about $6.2 billion. Of this sum $854 million 
(roughly two years’ appropriations) went to weapons procurement and research and 
development; the ground forces received only $344 million of these appropriations, or an 
annual average of $21 million for new procurement.”124  This severely limited the 
amount of equipment the Army could develop and procure. Stewart and the Center of 
Military History concur that for much of the interwar period (until the mid to late 1930s) 
“Army arsenals and laboratories were consequently handicapped by small budgets. Little 
new equipment was forthcoming for ground units until Army appropriations began to rise 
in 1936.”125   
Also, the Army leadership during the interwar period focused more on a major 
World War I challenge—force mobilization and deployment—that aligned scarce 
funding largely in favor of force preservation (particularly highly deployable, light, 
mobile infantry forces), and less toward materiel development and acquisition. According 
to Stewart and the Center for Military History, “during the interwar era the Army focused 
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its limited resources on maintaining personnel strength rather than on procuring new 
equipment.”126 This fostered neglect in the development of tank and combined arms 
doctrine, and created an institutional strong emphasis on light tanks at a time when 
potential peer or near peer rivals (Germany and Russia) were building medium and heavy 
tanks. Stewart and the Center for Military History concur that the Army’s light tanks 
“would not compare favorably in firepower, one on one, to World War II German and 
Russian models.”127  
Air forces proved the exception in terms of Army materiel development and 
acquisition during the interwar era because the strategic potential of airpower was greatly 
promoted by advocates, and evident to many at the highest levels of government.   Army 
modernization for much of the interwar was dominated by developments in the Army Air 
Corps. As mentioned earlier, the Coolidge administration, despite reducing spending, 
invested in the growth of the Army Air Corps by signing the Army Air Corps Act into 
law and initiating a five year development plan of the new branch.  
C. CONCLUSION 
The U.S. Army’s strategic and organizational culture during the interwar period in 
certain respects supported the changes required for an RMA. This is particularly true of 
the development of airpower, marked by the creation and enlargement of the Army Air 
Corps and subsequent well-funded improvements in airplane technology and doctrine 
(strategic bombing). The broader U.S. strategic culture supported greater investment in 
airpower because national leaders saw value in it (thanks in large part to airpower 
advocates like Brigadier General Billy Mitchell). 
 For the most part, however, the broader strategic culture and aspects of the 
Army’s culture, particularly intra-service parochialism in favor of infantry-centric 
warfare, combined to hinder the level of doctrinal, organizational and materiel changes 
that would have better propelled America’s shift from the World War I paradigm of static 
defensive warfare to high mobility combined arms maneuver. As discussed previously, 
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Army leaders like General John Pershing, who became Chief of Staff after General 
Peyton March, were skeptical of the potential of the tank. Their outlook contributed to 
institutional intolerance for doctrinal and technological development of the tank. By 
subordinating the Tank Corps to the infantry, tank development was yoked to its ability 
to support infantry, and not how well it could maneuver against mass formations of 
enemy tanks as it had to do in North Africa during World War II. This hindered 
American tank development in critical areas, including main gun armament and armor. 
Tank speed increased due to the motorization of infantry (tanks had to keep up). The 
German Reichswehr was able to develop tanks in the critical areas of main gun armament 
and armor (the Germans used thicker rolled armor) through dedicated research, 
development and experimentation on tank doctrine and technology. Based on the above, 
it is unsurprising that the U.S. Army focused on building medium tanks and light tanks 
like the M3 Stuart tank. The Stuart tank had a comparatively smaller main gun (37mm) 
than its German opponent in North Africa:  the German Panzer Mk IV, which had a 
75mm main gun and thicker, rolled armor.  
 This disparity in tank design and development proved fatal for many American 
tank crews in World War II. In the 1942 Battle of Happy Valley (the first U.S.-German 
tank battle of World War II) the U.S. Army was using the M3 Stuart tank, which was 
developed in 1941, while the Germans were using Panzer Mk IV tanks fielded in 1939. 
U.S. Army First Lieutenant Freeland A. Daubin Jr of the 1st Regiment, 1st Armored 
Division, wrote that he and “his loader picked out one particular Mk.IV tank… then 
pumped more than eighteen rounds [from the Stuart’s 37mm “squirrel rifles”] at the Jerry 
[German] tank…which ricocheted harmlessly off its armor.”  Daubin added that “the 
effect of the Mk. IV’s long 75mm gun on the Stuart” blew him out of his tank turret and 
killed his crew.128 The disparity between American and German tanks in lethality and 
survivability would continue throughout the war—replicated with later models (the U.S. 
M4 Sherman tank and the German Tiger tank).  
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III. INFLUENCE OF CONTEMPORARY CULTURE ON THE 
REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS 
An RMA requires a change in organization (structures) and doctrine (methods) 
based on new and/or existing technology that shifts widely accepted practices in the 
conduct of military affairs. An RMA drastically changes the pace and trajectory of 
technology and military evolution, compelling practitioners to rapidly adapt or become 
irrelevant. In the period from the 2011 withdrawal of U.S. conventional military forces 
from Iraq to the present, culture at the strategic and Army levels in the United States has 
greatly affected the change required for the realization of an RMA.  
This chapter examines exactly this question:  how culture at the strategic and 
Army levels has affected the organizational change necessary for a Revolution in Military 
Affairs. In the period under observation, U.S. culture at the strategic and Army 
organizational level, while supportive of the gradual evolution and positive development 
of military organization and technology, has been largely unsupportive of the bold 
organizational change required for an RMA. This chapter examines U.S. strategic culture 
using the previously established parameters; domestic politics and policymaking 
institutions, the American Way of War, national cognitive style, and presidential 
preferences concerning the use of force and diplomacy. U.S. Army culture is examined 
within the context of doctrine, organization, and materiel as fundamental elements of 
institutional transformation. 
A. STRATEGIC CULTURE AND THE RMA IN THE CONTEMPORARY 
PERIOD (2011–PRESENT) 
Parameters are required to analyze the impact of U.S. strategic culture on the 
changes required for an RMA. The parameters selected for this analysis of U.S. strategic 
culture stem from both history and the policy making institutions of the United States. 
This study approach is consistent with the third generation of strategic culture theory, 
which argues that a state’s strategic behavior is the result of higher level strategic 
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assumptions shaped by history, and lower level assumptions about the best strategic 
options for operating in the rules-based international regime.129   
According to Adamsky, scholars adopt parameters for the study of strategic 
culture from what he defines as “three different pools:  national-popular culture, 
characteristics of policy-making mechanisms in security affairs, and…organizational 
cultures of defense institutions.”130  Alan R. Millett and his fellow authors acknowledge 
these parameters in their study of the development of military policy by writing that “the 
political system and societal values have imposed constraints on defense affairs.”131  
Interestingly, these parameters for studying strategic culture are consistent with the 
previously discussed third generation of literature on strategic culture. Thus, 
contemporary U.S. strategic culture can be studied using units of analysis consistent with 
the following categories of parameters for understanding strategic culture:  the influence 
of domestic politics on U.S. security affairs, the national preferences in waging war (or 
the American Way of War), the use of force and diplomacy in U.S. security policy 
formulation, and the national cognitive style with regard to technology and organizational 
change. 
1. Contemporary U.S. Politics, Defense Policy and the RMA 
According to James Lindsay, “dollars are policy in Washington, DC, and the 
president generally cannot spend money unless Congress appropriates it. Thus, by 
deciding to fund some ventures and not others, Congress can steer the course of U.S. 
defense and foreign policy.”132  Gideon Rachman underscores Congress’ critical role in 
technological progress by writing that if lawmakers fail to create much needed jobs the 
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United States could potentially witness a “brain-drain” of the foreign minds it attracts and 
needs to maintain its position as a leader in technology, and by extension military 
innovation.133  Both authors refer to a characteristic of the U.S. political system:  the 
defense and economic policies of the leaders elected to the domestic political institutions 
affect the funding and human capital. In the case of human capital, the economic policies 
of the Congress could cause a massive emigration of America’s bright minds, which are 
vital to the innovation component of an RMA.   
In the period in question, Congress has reduced the defense budget as part of an 
overall effort to cut government spending. Funding limits or supports the Army’s 
capacity for research, development, and testing, as well as its acquisition of improved 
capabilities like the Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV). Funding also drives or 
hinders doctrinal experimentation with existing and emerging technologies, much as it 
did in the interwar period. In the case of the GCV, the Army had to cancel it due in large 
part to funding cuts. According to Andrew Feickert, Congress appropriated as per P.L. 
113–76 “$100.2 million for the GCV program for FY2014—a $492 million cut to the 
President’s FY2014 budget request.”134   
Thus, one can argue that in terms of domestic political institutions, and the 
national security policymaking process, the strategic culture of the United States in the 
period in question (from 2011 to the present) is largely unsupportive of the drastic 
changes in organization, methods and technology required for a Revolution in Military 
Affairs. This is because at the strategic level, culture has reduced the top down impetus, 
as well as the resources vital to the changes required for an RMA. 
2. The American Way of War, and the RMA  
The American Way of War, as discussed in the preceding chapter, affects the 
changes necessary for the realization of an RMA in the contemporary period in question. 
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In other words, how America perceives, prepares, fights and ends its wars continues to 
shape the changes in funding, manning, doctrinal, organizational, and technological 
innovation and experimentation required for an RMA. 
Traditionally, Americans prefer short, victorious wars in which they decisively 
dominate and defeat their adversaries. Meilinger wrote that America’s constitutional 
control of the military and its geographic isolation have—since the nation’s origins— 
combined to create a national perception of war as an anomaly to be decisively addressed 
and resolved.135  While this preference supports technological innovation for superior 
arms, it promotes an ad hoc approach to organizational change—construing the latter as 
something to be rapidly improvised under pressure in pursuit of a decisive victory in war. 
The American Way of War is harmful to the achievement of an RMA because it 
deprives the innovation process of resources between major armed conflicts. However, in 
the contemporary era of persistent threats and conflicts, the American Way of mobilizing 
and demobilizing resources in response to fluctuating conflicts is proving problematic for 
the attainment of America’s national security objectives. Preserving America’s global 
strategic role and fulfilling its commitments mandate a steady stream of resources and 
forces—much to the benefit of the RMA process. This would overcome the national 
strategic culture of drastically cutting forces and military spending between conflicts.   
3. Force and Diplomacy in U.S. Foreign Policy and the RMA 
Presidents whose operational code favors American military power over 
diplomacy for protecting and advancing U.S. interests in international politics are more 
likely to invest in defense funding and innovation—both factors that support the 
realization of an RMA. Presidents Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush fit this profile. 
According to Hook, Reagan’s operational code shaped his “confrontational approach 
toward the Soviet Union,” while George W. Bush’s operational code “could be seen 
in…his forceful response to the September 2001 terrorist attacks.”136   
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Presidents who favor diplomacy and multilateralism in international affairs see 
less utility in making great investments in defense capabilities compared to other areas of 
policy. This affects the resources vital to experimentation and innovation. This is evident 
in the continued military drawdown, influenced in part by President Barack Obama’s 
operational code, which favors diplomacy over force. The president can support or 
hamper the pursuit of an RMA in terms of his security strategy and directives to the 
military, which are shaped in part by public opinion and Congressional input. For 
example, military conflict is arguably a potent catalyst for changes in military 
organization, doctrine, and technology. Thus, a U.S. president’s decision to engage in or 
withdraw from military conflict impacts the resources and impetus for change supportive 
of an RMA. 
In the period in question, the Obama administration ended the U.S. combat role in 
the Iraq campaign in 2011, and it ended the combat phase of the NATO-led Afghanistan 
operation in December 2014. Though the administration has since July 2014 been 
resending U.S. troops to Iraq, the force levels have not been on the scale of the ground 
counterinsurgency campaign from 2003 to 2011, and therefore cannot drive innovation 
and organizational changes in the same way. Thus, the Obama administration’s war 
termination strategy and bid to avoid large-scale ground conflicts deprive the change 
process of a powerful catalyst—armed conflict. 
 According to Hook, President Obama’s operational code rests on “the principled 
belief that the United States should provide moral leadership in…foreign policy” and on 
causal beliefs that “led him to revive diplomatic cooperation, and affirm U.S. support for 
international law.”137  The Obama administration has to date opted for diplomacy and 
non-lethal assistance in the Ukraine crisis. It has ruled out sending lethal military 
assistance, and any use of military force. According to President Obama, the sanctions his 
administration has levied on Russia in the Ukraine crisis have imposed “sufficient costs 
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on Russia that … President Putin should want to resolve this diplomatically, [and] get 
these sanctions lifted.”138 
4. The National Cognitive Style and the RMA 
In the contemporary period since the 2011 troop withdrawal from Iraq, America’s 
generally logical-analytical national cognitive style or pattern has supported military 
technological innovation in principle, but has refrained from aggressive experimentation 
with new organizations and methods of applying such technology. The nation’s generally 
logical-analytical cognitive style characteristically favors a gradual evolution in warfare 
congruent with the current paradigm of military thought and theory. For example, the 
U.S. Army continues to promote the development and use of drone technology in an 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capacity to support ground 
maneuver. The Army is not likely to experiment with concepts like maneuvering 
battalions and regiments of drones in a combined arms maneuver, or using them to 
monitor whole cities in counterinsurgency campaigns because such applications appear 
too far outside the current paradigm of combined arms maneuver; in other words, such 
concepts appear to skeptics as an illogical progression of ground maneuver as we now 
know it. Like Combined Arms Maneuver, such bold concepts are more likely to be 
emulated based on their successful employment in conflict by others. 
In summary, America’s logical-analytical cognitive style, unlike the holistic-
dialectical style, does not promote consideration of wider applications of technology 
outside the current construct of military doctrine and organization. It lacks the impetus to 
pursue new concepts of warfare that do not appear to be a logical progression of the 
existing paradigm. In its pragmatic approach to innovation and change this cognitive 
style—perhaps inadvertently—preserves dogma in the current paradigm of military 
thought, in contrast to a holistic-dialectical cognitive pattern that seeks wider applications 
of technology that include bold organizational changes. 
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B. U.S. ARMY CULTURE AND THE RMA IN THE CONTEMPORARY 
PERIOD 
The organizational culture of the U.S. Army in the contemporary period 
influences the change required for the realization of an RMA. For the most part, the 
culture promotes the technological component of the RMA process but is highly resistant 
to bold organizational change (i.e., outside the current paradigm), the other critical 
component to the RMA process. As noted in Chapter I, the literature on organizational 
culture identifies units of culture that can be used as parameters for the study of 
organizational culture. These units include practices, values, and methods for solving 
problems. The previously used parameters of doctrine, organization and materiel can be 
considered units of culture because they are part of the Army’s transformation 
framework. In other words, these are critical areas of emphasis for implementing change 
in the U.S. Army. They help to ensure that change is comprehensive.   
1. Army Doctrine Change and the RMA in the Contemporary Period 
According to the RAND Corporation “military doctrine is the fundamental set of 
principles that guides military forces as they pursue national security objectives…these 
principles… can range from the policies and procedures put in place by a particular 
military branch to the tactics and techniques taught to new members during training.”139 
Doctrinal research that is focused on developing new methods and organizations (and that 
is attuned to the range of military operations for employing existing and emerging 
technology) is critical to realizing an RMA. The U.S. Army has institutions like the Army 
Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) and its sub-organization the Brigade 
Modernization Command (BMC) that aspire to such doctrinal research. However, their 
focus is largely on the integration of new and emerging technological capabilities into 
current and modified versions of the Army’s operating concept and doctrine. These 
institutions are less focused (perhaps owing in part to current funding cuts) on the 
research, development and experimentation of bold new methods and organizations that 
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optimally employ existing and emerging technology in an effort to shift the current 
paradigm of military affairs. The Army emphasizes the integration of emerging 
technological capabilities, and sees this as a “fundamental function for ARCIC. It 
involves bringing together Soldiers with the right equipment and training at the right 
place and time.”140 ARCIC and other organizations, including the Army Test and 
Evaluation Command, that test new capabilities underscore the Army’s commitment and 
capacity to innovate and integrate existing and emerging technologies into current tactics, 
techniques and procedures. This is a gradualist approach to transformation that, while 
consistent with the national logical analytical cognitive process, is unsupportive of an 
RMA.   
The Army’s recent counterinsurgency war experiences will continue to determine 
future innovation and organization even in the face of discontinuity (e.g., the emergence 
of conventional near peer adversaries such as Russia and China). This is similar to the 
interwar era in which World War I experiences strongly influenced Army thought and 
change. Recently, Lieutenant General Herbert R. McMaster of the Army Capabilities 
Integration Center observed that “what’s going to be really important for the Army and 
for our military in general, is what we’ve learned from the past…years of war. We need 
to use what we’ve learned to make a grounded projection into the near future and to 
inform our understanding of the problem of future armed conflict.”141   
Such was not the case post-Vietnam because the Army had a standing 
conventional threat to address in the Soviet Union that shaped its doctrinal refocus. This 
spurred the development of the Big Five Systems (the M1A1 Abrams tank, the M2 
Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the Apache Attack Helicopter, the Blackhawk Helicopter, and 
the Patriot Missile system) and major organizational changes (the better educated all-
volunteer force, and Air-Land Battle doctrine) in the 1980s to realize what is widely 
considered the RMA in the 1991 Persian Gulf war. Grounded future projections based on 
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past experiences narrow the scope of organizational and doctrinal development involving 
existing and emerging technologies (such as drones and cyber capabilities) to 
counterinsurgency wars much like they limited the development of combined arms 
doctrine in the interwar period and relegated tanks to the World War I paradigm of 
crawling behind infantry in mostly defensive warfare. 
Though traditionally resistant to bold doctrinal change, the Army has made great 
strides in the way it trains troops. Training doctrine has evolved on a micro (tactical) 
level to produce training concepts like the Combat Applications Training Course (CATC) 
and the Adaptive Leaders Methodology (ALM) that support the RMA process. These 
concepts emphasize discovery learning through problem solving early in a Soldier’s 
career. These concepts help produce adaptive Army leaders that are more disposed to 
support experimentation with new and existing technologies and ways to better employ 
them. Since experimentation is a key element of organizational change—a critical 
component in the RMA process—one can deduce that some current training approaches 
in the U.S. Army are supportive of the RMA process because they foster initiative and 
technical experimentation. 
In summary, on a macro level U.S. Army doctrine in the contemporary period 
discourages bold doctrinal and organizational experimentation with concepts outside the 
construct of counterinsurgency warfare. For example, despite the recent strategic 
rebalance to the Asia-Pacific—arguably the earth’s largest expanse of non-contiguous 
land mass (thousands of islands and peninsula landmasses)—the nation’s largest land 
force has yet to mitigate its inability to conduct conventional amphibious operations. The 
U.S. Army’s limitation to conventional ground and airborne maneuver may prove 
problematic in the Pacific given the non-contiguous geography of the region, and the 
proliferation of surface to air missile technology. According to the U.S. Department of 
State, “MANPADs, shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles, in the hands of criminals, 
terrorists, and other non-state actors pose a serious threat to…military aircraft around the 
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world.”142   The small size of the United States Marine Corps relative to the size of the 
Asia-Pacific region, and the capabilities of a “near peer” rival like China will make the 
Army’s amphibious maneuver limitation even more disquieting. This situation is 
reminiscent of the previously discussed concerns of Army Lieutenant General Trudeau 
during the interwar period about the need to develop amphibious capability to deal with 
the possibility of someday having to fight against the growing aggression of Japan in the 
Pacific.  
2. Army Organization, Change and the RMA in the Contemporary 
Period 
The U.S. Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) manual 
defines organization as a “unit or element enabled by a structure through which 
individuals cooperate systematically to accomplish a common mission.”143 The Army 
adopted a more modular organization (agile Brigade Combat Teams with organic support 
formations) which proved better suited for the counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and 
Afghanistan than the previous division-centric organization. According to Stuart E. 
Johnson and his co-authors, “the current force structure features superior versatility 
relative to the division-centric structure. This superior versatility is a result of the fact 
that…the BCTs are generally better armed and staffed than the units they superseded.”144   
The success of modularization in the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns and 
shrinking budgets dissuade the Army from boldly experimenting with new organizational 
concepts using existing and new technologies. Johnson and his co-authors concur that 
“by organizing a total of 73 BCTs with supporting structure, the modular force will have 
a reservoir adequate to cope with today’s wars, and operations that could reasonably arise 
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in the future.”145  Although the need for a modular BCT concept had been recognized 
since 1990, it took that decade and the force deployment demands of the Afghanistan and 
Iraq campaigns to begin testing and implementation—a testament to the Army’s 
resistance to bold organizational change reinforced by Congressional parsimony (Clinton 
administration force and budget reductions). Johnston and his co-authors wrote that “the 
Army recognized that change was needed to face the realities of the new [post-Cold War] 
security environment. This recognition began the transformation process. The Army 
Chiefs of Staff, from General Gordon R. Sullivan to General Schoomaker, all recognized 
the need to adapt. Modularity did not come about in isolation. It was part of a process that 
began in the early 1990s.”146   
Some might contend that the Army is experimenting with new organizations, and 
cite the 2010 activation of U.S. Army Cyber Command to conduct operations in cyber 
space as evidence of the Army’s evolving culture of organizational experimentation and 
change in the contemporary period. This organizational change—like most in the 
Army—was not, however, the result of bold experimentation with cyber technology and 
new organizational concepts but an overdue part of a national response to increasing and 
alarmingly successful foreign attacks against the United States in cyberspace. According 
to former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, he created Cyber Command because the 
“Department of Defense was not well organized internally to deal with cyber issues” and 
after its creation “he felt reasonably comfortable that Defense Department cyber 
networks were protected, even though they were attacked by hackers many times a 
day.”147   
3. Army Materiel, Change and the RMA in the Contemporary Period 
As mentioned earlier, Army materiel and acquisition policies are shaped by the 
national strategic culture and the organizational culture of the Army. Army materiel 
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development in the contemporary period is hindered by America’s strategic tradition of 
post-war Army drawdown, and a general strategic tradition of expanding the Army when 
needed. Despite the Army’s demonstrated importance in securing the nation’s strategic 
interests in an increasingly complex strategic environment, Congress has mandated 
significant cuts in force levels and budgets that continue to hinder materiel development, 
research and acquisition. The earlier mentioned cancellation of the Army’s Ground 
Combat Vehicle program due to funding shortfalls is an example. 
Congressionally mandated cuts and the Army’s institutional preference for what it 
develops and procures are driven to a considerable extent by strategic assumptions. Some 
scholars claim that nuclear weapons limit the usefulness of military action against the 
powerful nuclear states in the world, reducing the chance of another World War.148 
According to this viewpoint, due to the presence of nuclear weapons the U.S. Army is 
highly unlikely to fight the forces of a near peer adversary, and based on the last decade 
of war, counterinsurgencies are what the Army is most likely to fight. Thus, in the 
contemporary period, the Army predominantly plans and equips to fight modern 
counterinsurgencies and limited duration operations. This planning assumption is 
reminiscent of the interwar era approach—to man and equip the Army to put down 
counterinsurgencies like the Philippine rebellion in the 1890s, and rapidly deploy for 
limited operations like the 1917 Pancho Villa Punitive Expedition. This modest set of 
expectations about future war requirements largely focuses materiel development and 
procurement on the systems seen as the most effective for it—for example, the light 
Stryker vehicle. According to the 2014 Army Equipment Modernization Plan, the army 
invested approximately $49.9 million of its Research Development, Test and Evaluation 
(RDTE) funds in Stryker enhancement compared to $12 million and $10.9 million RDTE 
investment in the RQ-7B Shadow and MQ-1C Predator drones.149  Much as tanks 
required greater investment in the United States than was given to realize their potential 
during much of the interwar period, it appears that emerging drone and robotics 
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technologies are subject to the same sub-optimal investment despite their demonstrated 
potential for continuous reconnaissance with improved propulsion, and combined arms 
maneuver with miniaturization and enhanced munitions.    
C. CONCLUSION 
Based on its analysis of U.S. strategic and Army culture in the contemporary era – 
from the 2011 withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Iraq to the present – this chapter 
concludes that the strategic culture of the United States, viewed through the lens of 
domestic politics and policymaking institutions, the national way of war, and the use of 
force and diplomacy, is supportive of maintaining current technological capabilities with 
limited investment in new technologies while constraining the capacity for organizational 
experimentation and bold organizational change. The sub-optimal investment in 
organizational change is due in large part to congressionally mandated force reductions 
that are part of America’s strategic tradition.   
The organizational culture of the U.S. Army in the contemporary period, on the 
other hand, has evolved considerably since the interwar period. The U.S. Army has 
become a much more adaptive organization than it was in the interwar era. It promotes 
the technological experimentation supportive of an RMA, though it is largely unreceptive 
to bold new organizational concepts. The Army’s doctrinal and organizational construct 
is tightly aligned to the counterinsurgency campaigns of the last decade to such an extent 
that it hinders experimentation in light of new strategic priorities (including emerging 
conventional military rivals such as China and Russia) and stunts the exploitation of 
drones and robotics technology. Mandatory budget and force reductions originating 
within the broader strategic and political culture have hampered institutional support and 
attitudes to experimentation, innovation and change in the organization, methods, and 
technology necessary for an RMA. In the period since the 2011 withdrawal of U.S. 
combat troops from Iraq to the present, culture at the national strategic and Army levels 
has insufficiently supported the changes required for realizing an RMA.   
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IV. MANAGING CULTURE TO ACHIEVE AN RMA 
It is undeniable that culture is an abstract phenomenon, but its effects are evident 
and can in some circumstances be harmful. It is therefore incumbent on scholars to seek 
ways to better manage culture. This chapter of the thesis identifies and studies parallels 
and developments in U.S. strategic and Army organizational culture in the interwar and 
contemporary periods. Its goal is to promote understanding of aspects of the strategic and 
organizational cultures that hinder the technological innovation and bold organizational 
changes required for paradigmatic shifts in military affairs in America’s favor. In other 
words, the chapter looks at strategic and Army culture in the interwar and contemporary 
periods for ways to manage cultural factors so that they favor realizing an RMA.   
A. MANAGING STRATEGIC CULTURE TO ACHIEVE AN RMA 
The RMA process gains from the growing realization in American domestic 
politics that as a leading force for global stability America must maintain its armed forces 
at a level of readiness (including manning, training and equipment) commensurate with 
its global strategic interests and commitments in an international environment of 
persistent conflict and crisis. This reality clashes with the traditional U.S. strategic culture 
of drastic post-conflict reductions in forces and funding of the U.S. Army and its sister 
services. This traditional pattern hinders the realization of an RMA.   
1. U.S. Politics, Defense Policy and the RMA 
Congress continues to play a decisive role in determining the availability or lack 
of financial resources critical to the factors (doctrine, organization, and technology) of an 
RMA. Army and other military leaders in the Department of Defense seeking to change 
the tradition of drastic force and funding cuts in an era of persistent conflict should 
therefore focus on sensitizing Congress to the harmfulness of this strategic cultural 
practice. As previously explained, this tradition originated in a visceral seventeenth and 
eighteenth century distrust of large standing armies, which is reflected in the United 
States Constitution. During the interwar period, consistent with the national strategic 
culture, leaders in the War Department reinforced the notion that America did not need a 
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large standing army to protect its national interests despite the continued extensive U.S. 
engagement in the Pacific (including the Philippines) and to a lesser extent Europe. As 
Army Chief of Staff, General Pershing’s recommendation to Congress facilitated Army 
force and budget cuts, as well as the dissolution of the Tank Corps that was developing 
combined arms maneuver doctrine under Patton and Eisenhower. In the contemporary 
period Army and Department of Defense officials have cautioned against force and 
funding cuts in what is clearly a countercultural effort to preserve resources, forces and 
Army institutions—critical factors for realizing an RMA. Though this countercultural 
effort is proving weaker than the centuries-old American strategic culture of post-war 
force reductions, it will grow stronger if the services continue to promote public 
awareness of the fact that America’s role in the world is far more complex and substantial 
than its strategic tradition of post-war military reduction recognizes. The United States 
should therefore maintain a robust military force capable of defending its interests in a 
timely manner in multiple areas of the globe.   
American support and commitment to regional stability in the Middle East, U.S. 
security obligations in the Asia-Pacific, and NATO preparedness in Europe demand and 
mandate change in the strategic culture of post-war parsimony to the military. Today, 
congressionally mandated defense budget reductions endorsed by the president have 
further reduced the United States’ ability to provide standing forces in support of 
collective defense for NATO allies in Eastern Europe.  
 In trying to meet collective defense obligations in Europe amid traditional 
postwar defense spending cuts, the Obama administration rotates U.S. Army forces 
through Western Europe. Some NATO members, particularly in Eastern Europe, see U.S. 
rotational presence as an insufficient contribution to conventional deterrence and defense. 
Their views are understandable in light of an increasingly belligerent Russia.   For 
example, General Mieczyslaw Cieniuch, Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed 
Forces, stated in 2012 that his country was “not very happy that the U.S. military 
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involvement in Europe will be smaller than today’s, especially from the Polish point of 
view, because we are a border country of the [NATO] alliance.”150   
Additionally, U.S. defense budget cuts reduce the funding available for the NATO 
operations that the United States is willing to undertake. Leon Panetta, then the Secretary 
of Defense, warned alliance members in 2011 about the implications of the impending 
defense budget cuts, stating that while “many might assume that the United States 
defense budget is so large it can absorb and cover alliance shortcomings—make no 
mistake about it, we are facing dramatic cuts with real implications for alliance 
capability.”151 America’s tradition of postwar reduction of its armed forces—particularly 
the Army, as mentioned earlier—currently reinforced by the absence of a major hostile 
peer adversary like the Soviet Union was during the Cold War, reduces the forces and 
materiel the United States can contribute in support of NATO, and by the same token 
leverage in pursuit of an RMA. Secretary Panetta acknowledged this in calling for greater 
investment from other NATO members in light of pending U.S. defense reductions in 
2011. Panetta alluded to the American strategic cultural practice of dramatic postwar 
force reductions. He warned NATO members that the “immediate ‘hollowing-out’ of 
troops in the aftermath of a major operation has had unfortunate circumstances. After 
World War One, after World War Two, after Korea, after Vietnam, after the fall of the 
Iron Curtain, we made the mistake of hollowing out our forces. That cannot happen 
again.”152  
Unlike during the interwar period, Army and other military service and civilian 
leaders in the Department of Defense today draw attention to the growing gap between 
America’s strategic ends and objectives and the military means to realize them. This 
counterculture effort can be seen in recent statements by some leaders in the Department 
                                                 
150 Marcus Weisgerber,”In Europe, Mixed Feelings about U.S. Troop Cuts,” Defense News, January 
16, 2012, in NATO’s Balancing Act, David S. Yost (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 
2014), 353. 
151 Leon Panetta, “Panetta warns NATO of devastating cuts,” Russia Today,  October 05, 2011,  
http://103.5.149.34/usa/panetta-nato-us-united-165/.  
152 Panetta, “Panetta warns NATO of devastating cuts.” 
 60
of Defense. For example, General Raymond Odierno, the current U.S. Army Chief of 
Staff, recently stated that  
Today we have Soldiers deployed on every continent except Antarctica. 
We have Soldiers doing important missions in the security environment 
around the world. Frankly it is probably increasing in instability, which is 
requiring Army Forces to deploy to different places simultaneously. We 
are doing this while we continue to downsize the Army and take risks in 
modernization and readiness, and frankly I am starting to worry about our 
end strength.153   
Defense leaders should continue sensitizing Congress, the public and the 
presidential administration on the disparity between resources (funding and forces) for 
capability and U.S. security strategy and foreign policy objectives. The short and long 
term effects of continuing this disparity could be grave. Accurate strategic net 
assessments constitute a good tool for sensitizing key congressional leaders to the gap 
between American strategic ends and means. Contrary to General Pershing’s previously 
noted reluctance to preserve Army end strength (quantity of forces) adequate to defend 
U.S. interests in the Pacific and funding to support doctrinal and technological 
innovation, today’s Army and Department of Defense leaders are vigorous in sensitizing 
the nation and its civilian leaders to the harmful effects of an outmoded and rather 
anachronistic national strategic culture that shortsightedly reduces the military means to 
defend the highly evolved modern interests of a superpower.   
2. The American Way of War 
The RMA process of force transformation stands to benefit in the contemporary 
era of persistent conflict as Americans reluctantly but increasingly learn to appreciate that 
the rather anachronistic construct of war as an anomaly to be decisively dispatched 
followed by the swift retirement of the tools and institutions of war is not well suited to 
the modern challenge of persistent complex wars. In other words, the American Way of 
War that has been part of the nation’s strategic culture since its founding is not only 
harmful to the RMA process because it hinders the flow of necessary resources, but it is 
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also proving increasingly problematic and incompatible with America’s role as a global 
leader and stabilizing influence in the international system. Though the United States 
managed to shrink from this role in the interwar period in favor of isolationism and 
military cutbacks, it has since World War II embraced its responsibilities as a stabilizing 
force in the international system. During the Cold War the steady stream of resources and 
forces made available to the military and the Army in particular favored the RMA 
process, leading to the development of doctrine and technology (Air Land Battle and the 
previously mentioned ‘Big 5’ systems: M1 Abrams tank, M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, 
Patriot Missile, Blackhawk and Apache Helicopter) that changed the paradigm of 
maneuver warfare in the 1991 Persian Gulf War.  
In the contemporary era of persistent threats and conflicts, the American Way of 
mobilizing and demobilizing resources in response to conflict is problematic for the 
realization of an RMA. Preserving America’s global strategic role and honoring its 
commitments mandate a steady stream of resources and forces—much to the benefit of 
the RMA process. This is antithetical to the American tradition of cutting forces and 
military spending between conflicts. This antithesis is evident in the contemporary 
period; the American Way of War underlies the arguably precipitous termination of the 
U.S. combat role in the Iraq campaign in 2011, and the hasty troop withdrawal by the 
Obama administration. War termination approaches of this sort, though consistent with 
the American Way of War, are incompatible with modern conflicts, which require 
gradual and phased withdrawals of U.S. troops as host nation forces, political institutions 
and economic capacity are nurtured to operate independently. The contemporary era is 
one of complex persistent conflicts that do not lend themselves to decisive resolution by 
superior overwhelming force of arms but require supplemental economic and political 
efforts. Contemporary conflicts like those in Iraq and Afghanistan require long term 
national commitment, and the application of all the instruments of national power— 
diplomatic, intelligence, military and economic—for lasting resolution. Cutting the 
resources and forces of the military, particularly the Army, at a point prematurely 
construed as the end of a conflict may have the unintended consequence of renewing 
hostilities and creating a need to recommit already reduced forces, not to mention the 
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obvious hindrance to the RMA process. The recent U.S. recommitment of forces amid 
ongoing force reductions to fight the emergent Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 
Iraq is an example of this syndrome, which gravely worries informed military and 
civilian defense officials.   
The American Way of War is proving incompatible with America’s contemporary 
strategic role and interests and hindering the RMA process at a time when U.S. military 
technological superiority is challenged by multiple states and circumvented by non-state 
adversaries. America’s long standing way of war will continue to evolve as it interacts 
with modern strategic challenges. However, military and Army leaders in particular can 
shape the evolution of the American Way of War by normalizing the practice of 
sensitizing political leaders and the public on the real imbalances and disparities between 
Army capabilities and national strategic interests. As Army Secretary John McHugh has 
said, “we need, as an Army, to just continue to reinforce the reality of the issues so that as 
the overseers on Capitol Hill continue to look at the problem they can find a way to enact 
their positions into a final policy.”154  
3. Force and Diplomacy in U.S. Foreign Policy and the RMA 
Presidential preferences concerning the use of force in relation to diplomacy are 
critical for the resources required for an RMA. These preferences vary in each individual 
who occupies the Oval Office—as the examination in Chapter II of interwar era 
presidents indicates—so it is impossible to predict the operational code of the next 
president. A way for Army leaders to manage this highly variable yet critical part of 
American strategic culture is to understand the foreign policy goals and operational code 
of incoming presidents, and vigorously inform them and their teams regarding the 
Army’s roles and capabilities in achieving U.S. strategic objectives—taking care to 
highlight capability gaps. In other words, Army and other defense leaders should 
vigorously seek to shape the operational code of new presidential administrations and 
orient them as to the capabilities of the military services as foreign and security policy 
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tools consistent with their operational code. Secretary McHugh’s statement above 
captures the essence of this alternative in influencing and informing not just presidential 
but also Congressional perceptions of the value of preparing, maintaining and employing 
the Army and the other military services as instruments of power. 
4. The National Cognitive Style and the RMA 
Army and Department of Defense leaders today can support the RMA process by 
encouraging greater attention to holistic dialectical approaches to doctrinal and 
organizational experimentation with existing and emerging technologies. This aspect of 
American strategic culture is perhaps the hardest to manage because it is an inherent part 
of the psychological makeup—the cognitive process—of America’s prevalent and 
historically dominant Anglo-Saxon heritage. It is probable that even naturalized 
Americans from cultures with a holistic dialectical cognitive process assimilate the 
Anglo-Saxon originated logical analytical cognitive process.  
 The logical analytical cognitive process is evident in the Army’s preferred use of 
the term transformation to refer to gradual changes in military affairs within the existing 
paradigm rather than to acknowledge the theoretical and manifested paradigmatic shifts 
championed by RMA proponents. Incremental changes in technology within the current 
methods of force employment and organization are more acceptable to the nation’s 
leaders and the Army leadership than changes in technology, doctrine and organization 
that fundamentally change the paradigm of military affairs. This, however, does not mean 
the latter cannot happen; Army leaders should try to strike a balance between favoring 
continuities in certain areas of military affairs and being open to new methods and 
organizations employing existing and new technologies in those same areas. A tendency 
to overlook continuities in certain areas of military affairs can have strategically 
problematic consequences. In Iraq, for example, age-old counterinsurgency tactics (hit 
and run attacks) frustrated the U.S. military’s high tech capabilities that had prevailed in 
the 1991 Operation Desert Storm. As Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster, commander of 
the Army’s Capability Integration Center, has observed, “many of the recent difficulties 
we have encountered in strategic decision-making, operational planning, and force 
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development have stemmed, at least in part, from the neglect of critical continuities in the 
nature of war.”155   
Contrastingly, an institutional tendency to overlook, dismiss and even hinder the 
RMA process based on the lack of relevance of a conventional paradigm shift to the 
unconventional warfare aspect of military affairs or vice versa can replicate operational 
and tactical disadvantages in conventional warfare akin to the U.S. Army’s experience in 
World War II with opponents using better technology, organization and methods. Large- 
scale conventional wars may appear to be a thing of the past, as it seemed to many 
Americans after the “War to End all Wars” (World War I), but judging from history and 
human nature that may hardly be the case, so the Army should still pursue the RMA 
process and seek a paradigm shift relevant to current and future conventional war 
challenges.   
B. MANAGING ARMY CULTURE IN PURSUIT OF AN RMA 
Going forward, Army leaders can seek ways to make the organizational culture of 
the U.S. Army more open to experimenting and implementing bold organizational 
changes and methods of employing existing and emerging technologies in diverse types 
of warfare. In other words, Army leaders should remain open to the idea that changes in 
organization and methods coupled with new and existing technologies can shift the 
paradigm, not necessarily across the entire breadth of military affairs but in specific areas 
such as counterinsurgency and conventional war. Such openness is more conducive to the 
RMA process than critical arguments based on a faulty understanding of the RMA and an 
anachronistic affinity for current paradigms preserved in the name of continuity. 
Interestingly, France’s rather anachronistic focus on preparing for future defensive 
warfare in the interwar era can be regarded as a pragmatic appreciation for continuity in 
the World War I style of conventional warfare, despite the obvious contemporary 
changes in technology, organizations and methods of the era (including airplanes, radio 
communications, tanks and combined arms maneuver).   
                                                 




As previously explained, the Army has come a long way since the interwar era in 
terms of learning and modernization. There is ample proof today that the Army is a 
learning organization that is geared to technological innovation and modernization. 
Organizationally the Army is still extremely resistant to bold doctrinal and organizational 
experimentation based on existing and emerging technologies. There seems to be a 
prevailing institutional skepticism of the latter akin to that in the interwar era. Referring 
to the RMA, Army Lieutenant General McMaster recommended that military 
“professionals…be skeptical of ideas and concepts that divorce war from its political 
nature and…promise fast, cheap, and efficient victories through the application of 
advanced military technologies.” McMaster premised his institutional call for skepticism 
of the RMA on the argument that “advocates of the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ 
(RMA) predicted that advances in surveillance, communications and information 
technologies, along with precision strike weapons, would overwhelm any opponent, [yet] 
experience in Afghanistan and Iraq revealed the flawed nature of this thinking.”156   
Institutional skepticism and aversion to the RMA based on a misinterpretation of 
the concept as a fantastical tactical and operational elixir for strategic challenges are 
inimical to the RMA process. Army leaders can cultivate a culture supportive of the 
RMA process by understanding the latter as a means of gaining and maintaining a tactical 
and operational advantage in selective aspects of military affairs supportive of attainable 
strategic objectives.   
While keeping an eye to valid continuities in different types of warfare Army 
leaders should aspire to bold experimentation with organization, methods and technology 
in search of paradigmatic shifts in designated areas of military affairs (including 
conventional, unconventional, humanitarian/disaster relief, peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement operations). This aspiration should be tempered with the understanding that 
a paradigmatic shift in one area of military affairs (for example, conventional warfare) 
may not necessarily apply to counterinsurgency warfare; moreover, the paradigm shift of 
an RMA does not invalidate or remedy the challenges of visceral continuities in war such 
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as the human dimension (including its political and socioeconomic aspects). Paradigmatic 
shifts in aspects of military affairs are desirable and worthy of pursuit because they can 
provide tactical and operational advantages to help the U.S. armed forces achieve the 
political objectives defined in national strategy.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
Culture has undoubtedly influenced military affairs throughout history. This thesis 
has studied the influence of culture on military affairs from the standpoint that the history 
of warfare can be interpreted as a series of Revolutions in Military Affairs. Defined as a 
paradigmatic shift in the conduct of military affairs spurred by the confluence of 
organizational change with new technologies and concepts of operations, the Revolution 
in Military Affairs inherently contradicts interpretations of the history of warfare as a 
gradual evolution of technologies and tactics with no paradigmatic shifts. This thesis did 
not, however, explore this debate. 
Instead, this thesis accepted the RMA as a relevant concept in the history of 
warfare, and explored the complex and powerful influences of American strategic culture 
and U.S. Army culture on the organizational, doctrinal, technological, funding and other 
factors vital to the realization of an RMA. The influences of U.S. strategic and Army 
organizational culture in the interwar period (1919–1941) and the contemporary period 
(since the 2011 withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Iraq) have helped highlight useful 
ways in which U.S. military and civilian leaders can manage cultural factors to change 
the paradigm of select areas of military affairs in America’s favor. 
The field of military affairs is extensive. It is therefore possible for certain aspects 
of the field (perhaps including conventional warfare) to undergo revolutions in tactics, 
technology and organization that other areas (perhaps including irregular warfare) might 
withstand. The literature on the RMA and military transformation to date does not fully 
explain this dynamic. In other words, the different categories of military affairs 
(including deterrence and peacekeeping) do not seem to feature in the debate and 
literature on the RMA and military transformation. Proponents of the RMA seem to focus 
on the more conventional aspects of military affairs, citing conventional wars like the 
1991 Persian Gulf War, while critics of the RMA cite irregular or unconventional wars 
like the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns of the last decade. Future works on the subject 
should distinguish the aspect of military affairs in which a paradigmatic shift is being 
witnessed or pursued with the intermingling of changes in methods and organization 
 68
combined with existing and new technologies. This distinction among sub-areas of 
military affairs will perhaps clarify whether some types of warfare are more susceptible 
to paradigmatic shifts than others. In other words, conventional war might be more 
susceptible to paradigmatic shifts (an RMA) than perhaps counterinsurgencies and 
irregular warfare, whose essence seems to have stood the test of time and technology.  
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